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I. INTRODUCTION
An exemption from federal income tax was traditionally granted to
certain types of organizations (hereinafter called "exempt organizations" or
"EOs")1. The exemptions were maintained so long as the EOs complied with
relatively clear federal limits. If the limits were exceeded, EOs were taxed on
a portion of their income via the unrelated business income tax ("UBIT") or,
in more serious cases, sanctioned by the loss of their exempt status.
Recently, these exemptions and limits have become targets of tax
"reform" and tax "simplification."2 As a result, the previously well-defined
limits for EOs are changing. Already there has been an adverse change in the
law regarding charitable giving: the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the
1. The term "exempt" will be used to describe these organizations instead of more traditional
terms such as "nonprofit" or "not-for-profit." The difference is that "exempt" organizations
are essentially created and defined by federal tax law while "nonprofit" or "not-for-profit"
organizations are primarily governed by state law. See, e.g., BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.1 (6th ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994).
2. Tax "reform" and "simplification" in this context began with President Carter whose
proposals would have had the effect of reducing the number of taxpayers with a tax incentive
for charitable giving. See, HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 4.1 at 53 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
THE PRESIDENT'S 1978 TAX PROGRAM, DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES
OF THE PROPOSALS 18 (Jan. 30, 1978)). The rational behind the reforms and simplifications
are discussed infra part II.B. 1.
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incentive for donations by reducing the number of taxpayers eligible to obtain
a charitable contribution deduction.3
More change is on the way. EOs are being scrutinized as untapped
sources of federal tax revenue. Even though the scrutiny has not yet caused
a significant statutory change, the IRS is enhancing its enforcement efforts
and the courts are reinterpreting case law, particularly in the area of the
UBIT.5 Formerly solid exemption limitations are becoming blurred.6
There is every indication that the trends toward decreased charitable
contributions and increased tax collection will continue and will adversely
affect EOs.7 In this climate, EOs must be aware of their options to avoid the
inadvertent loss of their exempt status and the unnecessary imposition of
federal income tax.
With the hope of clarifying a difficult issue, this paper examines the
traditional categories of E~s,8 rationales for their exempt status,9 tests for
gaining and maintaining their exempt status, 10 standard tests used to impose
UBIT,II and ways in which the traditional tests and standards are changing.
Furthermore, this paper predicts areas of future change, 2 discusses ways in
which EOs can immediately strengthen their exempt status to avoid unneces-
sary UBIT, 13 and suggests principled arguments which can be used to halt
additional unwarranted incursions by tax "reformers" and "simplifiers."' 4
3. The charitable deduction contribution is beyond the scope of this paper, except for
minor references. See, e.g., infra part II.B.3.b. However, for more on this topic, see HOPKINS,
supra note 1, § 4.1.
4. The most notable effort occurred in 1987 when Congressional hearings focused on
allegedly competitive practices by tax-exempt organizations. Unrelated Business Income
Tax: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 22, 25, 26, 29 and 30, 1987) (Ways and Means Committee Print
100-30). As discussed by HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 56, the Subcommittee asked about
EO's income-producing activities, the resulting revenue, the relationship between increases
in income-producing activities and federal budget cuts, the efficacy of the unrelated business
income tax rules, the adequacy of reporting for unrelated business income, and the adequacy
of the IRS' enforcement program for EOs.
5. See infra, part III - IV.
6. Id.
7. See HOPKINS, supra note 1, §§ 38.1 - 38.4, particularly at 843.
8. See infra, part II.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra, part III.
12. See infra, part IV.
13. See infra, part VI.
14. See infra, part V.
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II. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
A. An Overview of Facts About EOs
1. Types of EOs
Most EOs are rigidly 5 defined in section 50 1(C) 16 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code ("IRC"). 7 They encompass more than America's well-known
"charitable" organizations such as the United Way and the Salvation Army.
They include America's churches, business leagues, social clubs and sports
leagues; as well as some of America's most prominent schools and hospitals.
EOs not only include organizations commanding wide public support, but also
more controversial organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Star Trek
Fan Club.
2. Economic Power of EOs
EOs wield significant economic power. Some EOs are substantial and
sophisticated in their own right. For example, in 1989, the American National
Red Cross reported over $1.1 billion in revenue and Harvard University re-
ported over $6.5 billion in assets.' 8 The numbers are even more impressive
when EOs are considered as a group. Each year EOs generate revenues ex-
ceeding $750 billion-roughly 15% of the nation's GNP.' 9 Furthermore, total
contributions to charity keep rising. Gifts to charitable organizations equaled
$79.84 billion in 1985, $116.8 billion in 1991 and $124.3 billion for 1992.20
15. Knights of Columbus Bldg. Ass'n of Stamford, Connecticut, Inc. v. United States, 88-
1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9336 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 1988) (§ 501(c) "generally consists of narrowly
defined categories of exemption," which "are replete with rigid requirements" that "a putatively
exempt organization must demonstrate it meets").
16. The Code states that "[a]n organization described in subsection (c) or (d) [of § 501] or
section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation ... unless such exemption is denied under
section 502 or 503." I.R.C. § 501 (1994).
17. Throughout this paper, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is cited only by its section
("§") number.
18. See James Cook, Businessmen with Halos, FORBES, Nov. 26, 1990, at 100, 106.
19. Id. Cf., VIRGINIA ANN HODGKINSON AND MURRY S. WEITZMAN, DIMENSIONS OF THE
INDEPENDENT SECTOR, (2d ed. 1986) [ hereinafter Hodgkinson & Weitzman], cited by
HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1.7 (The "independent sector" (composed of §501(c)(3)-(4) entities)
had a 5.6 percent share of total national income ($3.144 trillion) as contrasted with the for-
profit sector's share of 79.3 percent and the government's share of 14.5 percent).
20. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND RAISING COUNCIL, GIVING USA (New York, 1993)
quoted in HOPKINS, supra note 1 at Supp. 3. Cf., HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1.7 beginning at
22 discussing Hodgkinson and Weitzman, supra note 19 which indicates that, in 1984,
contributions were the source of 26.9 percent of the funds received by the independent sector.
Other amounts were received from dues, fees and other charges (37.8 percent), government
(26.9 percent) and other sources including investments (8.4 percent). HOPKINS, supra § 1.7.
19961
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B. Pros and Cons of EO Status
1. Theories Supporting the Existence of EO Status
Several theories (rather than a single unifying theory) support the exist-
ence of EOs.2' These theories, including "tradition" and oft cited public and
tax policies, are central to the existence of EOs.
a. Tradition
Onerationale for exemption is pure "tradition." The federal income tax
exemption for charitable and other organizations was implemented when the
income tax originated in 1913.22 The committee reports accompanying the
1913 act are largely silent on the reasons for initiating and continuing the
exemption. It is often presumed Congress simply found that tax relief was
warranted and explanations were unnecessary. 23 This presumption is prob-
ably accurate because tax exemptions for charitable organizations (from ex-
cise taxes, for example) were common long before 1913, particularly for
religious organizations. 2
4
b. EOs Lessen The Burdens Of Government
The most common rationale for exemption is a long-standing public
policy to exempt from federal income tax those organizations which lessen the
burdens of government. The U.S. Supreme Court stated early on that "the
exemption is made in recognition of the benefit which the public derives from
corporate activities of [EOs], and is intended to aid them when not conducted
for private gain. ' 25 One of the rare early congressional reports further sup-
ports this public policy rationale:
The exemption... is based upon the theory that the government is com-
pensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and
by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. 26
Without EOs, the government would have to perform additional services. In
return for the services EOs provide, the government is willing to forego tax
21. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 69 (1981); See also James J. McGovern, The
Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523 (1976).
22. Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 66 (1913) (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. (1994)).
23. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1.3, at 8.
24. See, e.g., Trustees of the First Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Atlanta, 76 Ga.
181 (1886); SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA, 482-528
(1902).
25. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores de la Provincia del Santisimo Rosario de
Filipinas, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924).
26. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1.3 n.n.32, citing H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
49 (1939).
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revenues it would otherwise receive.
c. Fostering Voluntarism and Pluralism
Also important to exempt status are the public policies to foster
voluntarism and pluralism."v That is, society is thought to benefit from the
dedication of private resources to the public good and from the fact that pri-
vate resources can be more flexibly and efficiently devoted than governmental
ones. 8 With regard to voluntarism, Norman Fink, during his tenure as Vice
President for Development of Columbia University, stated:
Voluntarism has been responsible for the creation and maintenance of
churches, schools, colleges, universities, laboratories, hospitals, libraries,
museums, and the performing arts; voluntarism has given rige to the pri-
vate and public health and welfare systems and many other functions and
services that are now an integral part of the American civilization. In no
other country has private philanthropy become so vital a part of the na-
tional culture or so effective an instrument in prodding government to
closer attention to social needs.29
With regard to pluralism, George P. Shultz, then-Secretary of the Treasury,
stated in testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means that:
"[EOs] are an important influence for diversity and a bulwark against over-
reliance on big government."30 Schultz was echoing an old theme set forth by
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty (1859):
Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and
voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments and
endless diversity of experience. What the State can usefully do is to make
itself a central repository, an active circulator and diffuser, of the experi-
ence resulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each experimen-
talist to benefit by the experiments of others; instead of tolerating no ex-
periments but its own. 31
The U.S. was founded on the notion that society need not and should not rely
upon big government. The principles of voluntarism and pluralism are cen-
tral to this notion.
27. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
28. Edward H. Rabin, Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV.
912, 920-25 (1966).
29. Norman S. Fink, Taxation and Philanthropy-a 1976 Perspective, 3 J. COLL. & UNIV.
L. 1, 6-7 (1975).
30 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE, 72 (Apr. 30 1973).
31. Quoted in HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1.6, at 20.
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d. Tax Policy
Tax policy also justifies exemption from taxation.32 Tax policy indicates
that individuals should be allowed to associate to accomplish their goals more
effectively. Since income is not generated by the association (money is sim-
ply pooled for spending purposes), income tax would be improper.
e. Political Process
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the political process can
create EOs without reference to the policies discussed above. For example,
professional football leagues3 3 were granted EO status as part of the legisla-
tion effecting the merger between the National Football League and the
American Football League.34 Similarly, university investment vehicles35 were
an outgrowth of Congress' effort to overturn an IRS ruling regarding a com-
mon investment fund. 36
2. Criticisms of EOs
A number of criticisms are aimed at the tax exempt status of EOs. Ac-
cording to critics, they drain government resources, exploit tax loopholes, and
force others to shoulder the burden of an increasing demand for governmen-
tal programs. 37
Other criticisms are aimed at the charitable deduction contribution. The
major complaint is that a taxpayer in a high tax bracket obtains a higher de-
duction for a charitable gift than one in a low tax bracket.3"
A recent criticism focuses on the "commerciality" of successful EOs. 39
The EO's fund-raising activities are often the same activities undertaken by
commercial businesses. Businesses complain that EOs compete against them
unfairly because EOs have a "halo" effect, no start-up costs, a ready-made
market, and the ability to undercut the commercial competition because they
pay no income tax.40 Businesses argue that EOs receiving the benefit of com-
32. See, e.g, McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 458 (D.D.C. 1972).
33. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (1994).
34. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1.6, at 19-20.
35. I.R.C. § 501(f) (1994).
36. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 1.6, at 20. See also George D. Webster, Certain Inconsistencies
and Discrimination in the Taxation of Exempt Organizations, 21 J.TAX 102 (1964).
37. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 40-41.
38. Id. §§ 3.1-3.3.
39. HOPKINS, supra note 1 , §§ 38.1-38.4, at 829.
40. See, e.g., Statement by Rep. James D. Santini, Chairman, Business Coalition for Fair
Competition issued to the Comm. on Small Business, Subcomm. on Procurement, Taxation
and Tourism of the United States House of Representatives, reprinted in 94 TAX NOTES
TODAY, 117-25, June 17, 1993.
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mercial activities should also accept the responsibilities of commercial ven-
41tures at tax time.
The "commerciality" argument was instrumental in the repeal of the
exempt status for the Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations. The chair-
man of the House Committee on Ways and Means working group for gather-
ing information on the exemption repeal stated "[i]f they quack like a profit-
making entity and waddle like a profit-making entity, they should be taxed
like a profit-making entity. '42 The intricacies and implications of the
commerciality doctrine are explored further in Section IV.
3. Advantages of EO Status
EO status has several advantages. Among other things, EOs are exempt
from federal income tax, may qualify to offer income tax deductions to indi-
vidual donors, and are targeted for donations from private foundations and
state and federal agencies.
a. Federal Tax Relief
The most important advantage shared by all EOs is the exemption from
federal income tax.13 Additional tax relief is provided from federal excise tax
and, in most cases, from state income and property taxes.
44
b. Deductible Contributions
Another advantage is the fact that donors' contributions to many EOs are
deductible.4 5 The deduction is usually available only for donations to orga-
nizations qualifying under IRC section 501(c)(3) (called "501(c)(3)" or
"charitable" organizations). 6 However, IRC § 501(c)(6) provides for simi-
lar treatment for trade associations because contributions are deductible as
business expenses under IRC section 162.17 Furthermore, subsidiary chari-
table foundations can be formed to collect deductible contributions which can
then be funneled into organizations that are not otherwise qualified.
4 8
41 Id.
42. Anne Swardson, Blue Cross Faces Loss of Its Tax Break, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1985,
at A23.
43. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 2.2, at 31. This general advantage has certain exceptions,
(e.g., the UBIT, discussed infra part III) as well as the tax on excessive legislative activities,
the tax on certain political activities or (if private foundations) a variety of excise taxes and
the tax on net investment income. Id. Except for the tax on unrelated business income these
various taxes are beyond the scope of this paper.
44. Id. § 2.2.
45. Id. As discussed, supra note 3, the charitable deduction contribution is, for the most
part beyond the scope of this paper.
46. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 2.2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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c. Increased Likelihood of Funding
EOs, especially charitable ones, are more likely to receive grants from
private foundations or state and federal agencies. This is because foundations
can distribute funds to public charities in satisfaction of the mandatory payout
requirements, and also, because many state and local governments make
grants or contract only with EOs.49
d. Other Opportunities
Other advantages5" of EO status include an allowance for tax sheltered
annuities, 5 exemption from unemployment tax,52 preferred mailing rates,53
exemption from gaming restrictions and taxes,54 exemption from federal price
discrimination laws55 and exemption from user fees on permits for industrial
use of specially denatured distilled spirits.56
4. Disadvantages of EO Status
To obtain and maintain these advantages, EOs are subject to stringent
application, operation, and reporting requirements.
a. Application Requirements
Most charitable EOs and certain other EOs 57 must apply to the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") for recognition 58 of their tax-exempt status within
fifteen months from the end of the month in which they were organized.5 9
Other EOs have no preliminary application requirements. For EOs with no
such preliminary requirements, the IRS may issue special rulings or determi-
nation letters if the EO desires certainty.60
b. Operating Restrictions and Requirements
Actual operating restrictions and requirements vary with each type of
EO. As discussed throughout Section II, restrictions and requirements are
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. I.R.C. § 403(b) (1994).
52. I.R.C. § 3306(c) (1994).
53. 39 U.S.C. §§ 4355(a); 39 U.S.C. 4452(d) (1994).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 481 (5th Cir. 1976).
55. 15 U.S.C. §13(a)-(c) (1994).
56. I.R.C. § 5276(c) (1994).
57. In addition to organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994), organizations desiring
EO status by reason of I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(9), (17) or (20) (1994) must file with the IRS for
recognition of their exempt status.
58. While only Congress can "grant" a tax exemption, the IRS can "recognize" it. See,
e.g., Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp. v. United States, 400 U.S. 4 (1970).
59. I.R.C. § 508(a) (1994), Treas. Reg. §1.508-1(a)(2)(I) (1995). See, e.g., Peek v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 912 (1980); Rev Rul. 90-100, 1990-2 C.B. 157.
60. Rev. Proc. 92-4, 1992-1 I.R.B. 66.
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placed on the EOs' organizational structure, activities, and use of revenues.
c. Annual Returns
EOs must maintain their status by filing annual information returns. 6'
These returns are in the nature of a self-audit which include information about
gross income, receipts, and disbursements. 62
C. Tests for Determining EO Status
1. Charitable Organizations-Public Charities
EOs authorized under section 501(c)(3) are loosely termed "charitable"
organizations. 63 Each organization must be scrutinized to determine whether
it meets many, often vague, standards and tests. The most important standards
and tests are contained in the statutory and common law definitions of a
"charitable" organization, the organizational and operational requirements,
the "primary purpose" rule, and the doctrines barring private inurement, leg-
islative activities, and political campaign activities.
a. Charitable Organizations Defined
Determining the meaning and scope of the word "charitable" in federal
tax law is difficult.64 IRC section 501(c)(3) and the underlying regulations
specify broadly that charitable organizations include educational, scientific
and religious organizations (along with five other specifically named catego-
ries).65 However, this broad definition does not clarify the matter.
Each type of charitable organization is further defined. For example, the
word "educational" from the broad definition is subdefined by regulation and
distinguished from the term "mere opinion. '66 Despite the additional defi-
nition, the meaning of "educational" has been much litigated and the real
standards remain elusive. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
concluded in 1979 that the term "educational" was unconstitutionally vague
61. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(1) (1995).
62. Id. HOPKINS, supra note 1, Ch. 37 (Chapter 37, discuss these requirements in detail).
63. Treas. Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1995) provides an expansive federal tax definition of
the term "charitable." There are several ways for an organization to qualify as a "charitable"
entity. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 5.4, at 76.
64. See Note, Developments-Nonprofit Corporations 105 HARV. LAW. REV. 1578, 1615
(1992). See also HOPKINS, supra note 1, §§ 5.1-5.2, at 69-72.
65. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) provides exemption for the following:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment). or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals....
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (1995).
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and that the IRS used the term to improperly condemn the content of an
organization's views.67 Now, the IRS simply reviews "the method by which
the advocate proceeds from the premises he furnishes to the conclusion he
advocates. '68 What this means, essentially, is that the IRS looks at "all the
facts and circumstances. '69 Thus, the definitions aren't much help.
Defining a religious organization is no less difficult than defining an
educational one. Religious organizations are treated specially, however,
because of the constitutional separation of church and state. It is virtually
impossible for the federal government to challenge an organization's claim
that it is a religious organization simply because of the unorthodox nature of
the religion.7 0 If religious organizations are challenged, it is on the basis that
they are a commercial enterprise for private gain" or that they engage in in-
appropriate social activities.
7 2
Common law must also be considered when defining the scope of chari-
table EOs. The judicially crafted "public policy" doctrine gives the IRS au-
thority to revoke or deny an organization's tax-exempt status if it has or will
engage in such activities as operating a racially discriminatory school,73 or in
an activity that is violent or illegal. 74 This policy was most clearly enunciated
by the Supreme Court in 1983. 71 The Court concluded that a charitable entity
"must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest. '76 The
entity's "purpose must not be so at odds with the common community con-
science as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be con-
ferred. '7 7 Discrimination and other violent or illegal activities are not al-
lowed even if they are imposed on the basis of sincerely held religious be-
liefs.7 8
b. The Organizational and Operational Tests
By regulation, a charitable organization must meet both the "organiza-
67. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'g 494 F.
Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979).
68. National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C.Cir. 1983).
69. Rev. Proc 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729.
70. See discussion in HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 9.2, at 203.
71. Riker v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. den., 355 U.S. 839 (1957).
72. First Libertarian Church v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 396 (1980).
73. Id.
74. See Synanon Church v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 967, 978-79 (D.D.C.1984), aff'd,
820 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 381 (1984), aff'd 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. den., 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
75. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
76. Id. at 591-92.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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tional" and the "operational" tests. Failure to satisfy either one will prevent
qualification as a charitable EO.79
To satisfy the organizational test, the organizational documents must (1)
limit the organization's purposes to one or more of the listed exempt pur-
poses, 8° and (2) not expressly empower the organization to engage in any
activity (other than to an insubstantial degree) outside of its exempt pur-
poses 8' or to allow any assets to revert to the organizers. 82 According to the
IRS, the organizational test can be satisfied only by the "creating document".
On this matter, the Tax Court stated:
[T]he organizational test cannot be met by reference to any document that
is not the creating document. In the case of a corporation, the bylaws
cannot remedy a defect in the corporate charter. A charter can be
amended only in accordance with state law, which generally requires fil-
ing of the amendments with the chartering authority. In the case of a trust,
operating rules cannot substitute for the trust indenture. In the case of an
unincorporated association, the test must be met by the basic creating
document and the amendments thereto, whatever the instrument may be
called. Subsidiary documents that are not amendments to the creating
document may not be called on. 3
In other words, neither subsequent documents nor actual organizational ac-
tivities will satisfy the organizational test, even if they are entirely lawful.8 4
To satisfy the operational test, an organization must operate 5 exclu-
sively for one or more exempt purposes by engaging primarily in activities
which accomplish one or more of the exempt purposes specified in IRC sec-
tion 501(c)(3). 86 The important distinction between activities and purposes
may be confusing. 7 The Tax Court attempted to clarify the issue by stating:
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (1995); Levy Family Tribe Foundation v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 615, 618 (1978).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) (1995).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i) (1995).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)- 1 (b)(4) (1995). See, Chief Steward of the Ecumenical Temples
and the Worldwide Peace Movement and His Successors v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH)
640 (1985); Church of Nature in Man v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1393 (1985).
83. Colorado State Chiropractic Society v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 487 (1989). Cf. I.R.S.
Exempt Organizations Handbook (IRM 7751) § 332(2).
84. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 6.1, at 113 (setting forth the provisions which must be in the
creating documents as well as those which may be contained therein).
85. Well-drafted articles of incorporation are not sufficient.
86. See, e.g., Rev. Rut. 72-369, 1972-2 C.B. 245; see also Treas. Reg. § .501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)
(1995).
87. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 118.
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Under the operational test, the purpose towards which an organization's
activities are directed, and not the nature of the activities themselves, is
ultimately dispositive of the organization's right to be classified as a sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organization exempt from tax under section 501(a) .... [I]t
is possible for... an activity to be carried on for more than one purpose.
... The fact that ... [an] activity may constitute a trade or business does
not, of course, disqualify it from classification under section 501(c)(3),
provided the activity furthers or accomplishes an exempt purpose....
Rather, the critical inquiry is whether... [an organizations's] primary
purpose for engaging in its ... activity is an exempt purpose, or whether
its primary purpose is the non exempt one of operating a commercial
business producing net profits for... [the organization] .... Factors such
as the particular manner in which an organization's activities are con-
ducted, the commercial hue of those activities and the existence and
amount of annual or accumulated profits are relevant evidence of a forbid-
den predominant purpose.88 (emphasis added).
The operational test is used as a vehicle for applying the "private ben-
efit" test:89 that is, an EO will fail to satisfy the operational test if it confers
a private benefit. For example, a private benefit was conferred on the Repub-
lican Party where school trained political campaign officials and nearly all of
the school's graduates were employed by the Republican Party.9" Similarly,
a private benefit was conferred on beauty pageant organizers where a schol-
arship fund granted scholarships to beauty pageant contestants who, in return,
were contracturally required to perform for the pageant organizers.9 Even
though the school and the scholarship fund would otherwise have qualified for
EO status, they failed the operational test because the organizations' sole
purpose was to confer a private benefit upon third parties. If the private ben-
efit had been "insubstantial," the operational test would have been satisfied.9 2
The operational test is also used as a vehicle to apply other tests for tax-
exempt eligibility. Most notably, the operational test has been linked to the
evolving test of commerciality discussed in Section IV.
88. B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 356-57 (1978); Ohio Teamsters
Educ. and Safety Training Fund v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 189 (1981), aff'd, 692 F.2d 432
(6th Cir. 1982).
89. The private benefit rule is distinct from and more broad than the "private inurement"
doctrine. See part II.C. I.e. A private benefit can be conferred upon "disinterested persons"
whereas private inurement only occurs where "insiders" are involved.
90. Am. Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 TC. 1053 (1989).
91. Miss Georgia Scholarship Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 267 (1979).
92. See Nat'l Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 87-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) T[ 9602 (Cl. Ct. Oct.
30, 1987)(holding an organization that principally administers projects funded and
recommended by donors, for a commission, qualifies as a charitable entity).
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c. The "Primary Purpose" Rule
IRC section 501(c)(3) requires that an EO be organized and operated
"exclusively" for an exempt purpose. 93 However, as previously noted, 94 the
existence of an inconsequential nonexempt purpose does not necessarily de-
stroy an organization's charitable status. 95 As a result, what is often called the
"exclusively" rule is more correctly called the "primary purpose" rule. 96
An inquiry under the primary purpose rule should be made in two steps.97
The first step is to ask whether a nonexempt purpose exists. If it does, the
second step is to ask whether the nonexempt purpose is a primary or substan-
tial purpose. An exemption is precluded only where both answers are positive.
By using this two-step inquiry, different courts have determined that a chari-
table entity violates the primary purpose rule when it pays retirement benefits
to its members, 98 but not when it provides them with medical care.99 The
retirement benefits were disallowed because their provision to members was
a substantial nonexempt.activity. Medical care was allowed because it fur-
thered the EO's exempt religious purposes.
d. Profitable Activities
Profit making activities are not an absolute bar to EO status if the activi-
ties accomplish or further an exempt purpose.'0 0 In fact, one court indicated
93. In this context, it is important to reiterate that "purposes" are not "activities." See
the related discussion, supra part lI.C.l.b. One of the few court decisions to fully explore
and properly apply this requirement as being a focus on purposes rather than activities is Aid
to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71'T.C. 202 (1978) (holding the sale of handicrafts is
neither an exempt purpose or a nonexempt purpose; "[r]ather, such sale is merely an activity
carried on by ... [the organization] in furtherance of its exempt purposes.") But, Cf. The
Newspaper Guild of New York, Times Unit-The New York Times College Scholarship
Fund v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 812 (1989) (IRS claimed the EO's activities were
similar to those of a commercial entity).
94. See discussion, supra part II.C.1.b.
95. Universal Church of Jesus Christ, Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 144(1988),
citing Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
96. United Church of Jesus Christ, Inc., 55 T.C.M. at 144. Some cases require even less
than a primary purpose-e.g., one court required only an "adequate fulfillment" of an exempt
purpose. Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973). The
IRS does not concur with this lesser standard. Rev. Rul 78-86, 1978-1 C.B. 144.
97. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 12.1, at 250-51 discussing Aid to Artisans, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra note 93.
98. Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of Westchester County, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 1750 (1981).
99. Bethel Conservative Mennonite Church v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984).
100. See, e.g., Presbyterian and Reformed'Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148,
156 (3d Cir. 1984)(refusing to endorse the view that accumulated cash automatically constitutes
undue commerciality by rejecting the notion that the volume of business defines the purpose
of an organization and stating that "the inquiry must remain that of determining the purpose
to which the increased business activity is directed").
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that the greater the organization's profits, the greater the likelihood that it's
purposes are tax-exempt.' 0' According to this court, an organization making
a "staggering amount of money" and generating an "astounding profitability"
could not be replicated in a commercial context.102 This was an extreme case,
however, and the decision was overturned on appeal.
It is most often held that an item can be sold for a profit only if the item
is "closely associated with and incidental to" the organization's tax-exempt
purpose and bears "an intimate relationship to the proper functioning" of it.103
Thus, an EO can to sell religious publications to members of its religious
following for a relatively small profit.' °4 However, an EO cannot publish and
sell nondenominational religious tracts at a competitive price if such activi-
ties yield substantial accumulated profits and if such activities are the
organization's primary concern. 105 As one court stated, "[if such broad and
profitable activities led to EO status, then] every publishing house would be
entitled to an exemption on the ground that it furthers the education of the
public." 106
Unfortunately, the line between an allowable profit and one that is for-
bidden is becoming increasingly difficult to draw. As will be seen in Section
IV, the court-developed "commerciality" doctrine and the "profit motive" test
adopted from IRC section 162 are blurring the boundaries.
e. The Private Inurement Doctrine
The "private inurement" doctrine 0 7 prohibits an organization from
allowing its net earnings0 8 (other than an incidental part'0 9) to inure to the
101. Am. Bar Endowment v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9204 (Cl. Ct. Jan. 31,
1984), rev'd, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
102. Id.
103. Saint Germain Found. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 648 (1956).
104. Id.
105. Id. Cf. Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, (Ct.CI. 1961), cert
den., 368 U.S. 985 (1962).
106. Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 924, 935-36 (N.D.Ind. 1967).
107. The private inurement doctrine is different than the prohibitions on private benefit.
See supra note 89.
108. The term "net earnings" has been interpreted in both the strict accounting sense See,
e.g., Birmingham Business College, Inc. v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1960); See
generally, Carter v. United States, 973 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992). The IRS has developed
criteria for assessing compensation arrangements based upon a percentage of the tax-exempt
organization's gross revenues considering (1) whether the compensation paid is reasonable,
whether the agreement was negotiated at arm's-length, whether the service provider had control
over the conduct of the organization and whether the payments have a "real discernible business
purpose. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 13.4, at 292-93.
109. The IRS has allowed private inurement as a matter of law and practice so long as the
private inurement is "incidental".
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benefit of private shareholders 11 0 or "insiders.""' This prohibition is not lim-
ited to the distribution of dividends, but also applies to the conferral of any di-
rect or indirect benefit."12 Insiders may not receive EO funds except as rea-
sonable payment for goods and services." ' There is no requirement that ser-
vices be donated," 4 but compensation must be reasonable and not exces-
sive." 5 A large salary is more likely to be considered unreasonable and ex-
cessive if family members are employed or if an employee receives more than
one form of compensation (fees, commissions, or royalties in addition to
wages)." 16
f Ban on Legislative Activities
No substantial part of a charitable EO's activities may constitute "car-
rying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation."' ' 7 A
public charity may comply with these rules under the "substantial part test"
or the elective "expenditure test."' 8
(1) The Substantial Part Test.
Under the substantial part test, the word "legislation" is defined broadly.
This broad definition means that an EO may not attempt to influence an ac-
tion by Congress, a state legislature, a local council or a similar governing
110. A few states still permit a nonprofit corporation to issue stock.
111. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). The IRS has stated that all persons performing services for
an organization are "insiders." See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39670 (Oct. 14, 1987); See also, Gen.
Couns. Me. 39498 (Apr. 24, 1986). HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 2.2, at 35 believes this is
"obviously" an overly broad reading of the of the concept.
. 112. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38459 (July 31, 1980); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39670 (Oct. 14, 1987).
See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39862 (Dec. 2, 1991) (hospitals may jeopardize their tax-exempt
status by forming joint ventures with doctors through which doctors are rewarded for referring
patients to hospitals, because such arrangements violate the prohibition on private inurement);
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(1)(ii), 1.501(a)-i(c), 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(2) (1994); Ginsburg v.
Commissioner, 46 T.C. 47 (1966); Rev. Rul. 76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154.
113. I.R.S. Exempt Organizations Handbook (IRM 7751) § 342.1(1)-(3).
114. See, e.g., Harding Hospital, Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
115. Id.
116. B.H.W. Anesthesia Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 681 (1979) (benefits received
by physician were reasonable considering the skills involved the nature of the services
provided). But compare, Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197
(Ct. Cl. 1969), cert den., 397 U.S. 1009 (1970); Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 531 (1980) aff'd, 670 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1981); Unitary Mission
Church of Long Island v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 507 (1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 163 (2nd Cir.
1981).
117. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). For a more complete explanation, see HOPKINS, supra note
1, Ch. 14, at 301-26.
118. Treas. Reg. §1.501(h)-l(a)(1)-(2) (1995).
119. Compare Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1995) with Treas. Reg. § 4911(e)(2)
(1995).
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body or, in a referendum or an initiative, an action by the general public." 19 An
EO is not prohibited from attempting to influence an action of the executive
branch or by independent regulatory agencies. 12 ° Such action is not consid-
ered "legislation."
Under the substantial part test, "direct" lobbying is forbidden but indi-
rect or "grass roots" lobbying is allowed. 12 1 An EO cannot directly present
testimony at public hearings held by legislative committees, correspond and
confer with legislators and their staffs, or publish documents advocating
specific legislative action. 22 However, an EO can indirectly appeal to the
general public to contact legislators or take other action. 123
An EO operating under the substantial part test must also determine
whether it's lobbying efforts are "substantial," a necessarily subjective en-
deavor. 124 One approach to measuring substantiality has been to calculate the
percentage of revenues an EO spends on legislative efforts, and compare it to
the EO's total expenditures for charitable purposes.125 However, this test has
been rejected where a minor expenditure by a prestigious EO has a "substan-
tial" impact on legislation. 26
(2) The Expenditure Test.
Because of the subjectivity and uncertainty inherent in the substantial
part test, Congress developed the expenditure test which was ultimately sub-
sumed within the Tax Reform Act of 1976.127 The expenditure test attempts
to utilize mechanical tests for measuring permissible and impermissible lob-
bying expenditures. 2s The expenditure test is more lenient because the term
"legislation" is defined more restrictively (thus allowing more "non-legisla-
tive" activities). 29
Five categories of activities are specifically allowed under the expen-
diture test. An EO may: (1) make available the results of nonpartisan analy-
120. E.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE
L.J. 359 (1972).
121 HOPKINS, supra note 1, §14.3, at 303.
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1995).
123. See, e.g., Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1952) cert. den.,
344 U.S. 865 (1952).
124. S. Rep. No. 94-938 (Part 2), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), cited by HOPKINS supra
note 1, § 1.4 n.n.74.
125. Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562 (3d. Cir. 1964), cert. den., 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
126. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. CI. 1974), cert. den., 419 U.S.
1107 (1975).
127. I.R.C. §§ 501(h), 504, 4911 and 6033(b)(8) (Supp. 1995).
128. An explanation of the formulas can be found at HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 14.4, at 312-
14.
129. Id.
[Vol. 12
18
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 12 [1996], Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/6
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: THEIR NATURE AND THE UBIT
sis, study, or research; (2) provide technical advice or assistance to a govern-
mental body in response to a written request for such advice or assistance from
the body; (3) appear before or communicate with a governmental body regard-
ing a decision the body might make about the existence or powers of the EO;
(4) communicate with bona fide EO members about legislation or proposed
legislation of interest to the EO, unless the communication directly encour-
ages the members to influence the legislation; and (5) routinely communicate
with a governmental body. 130
g. Prohibitions Against Political Campaign Activities
EOs may not participate or intervene in a "political campaign" with respect
to an individual who is a "candidate for public office."'' Unlike the ban on
legislative activities, the proscription against. political campaign activities is
absolute.'32 Despite the absolute nature of the statutory ban, the courts, as a
practical matter, ignore "slight" or "comparatively unimportant" devia-
tions. '
The ban is applied differently to political campaign activities than it is
to mere political activities. An EO cannot contribute to the political campaign
of a candidate for public office 34 or endorse a candidate. 35 However, after
much litigation, EOs have been allowed to cautiously enter the political mi-
lieu if they display a charitable (e.g., educational, or religious) purpose. Thus,
EOs are now permitted to issue "report cards" on legislator's votes, 136 spon-
sor public forums for political debates or impartial lectures on specific politi-
cal topics, 137 and donate to libraries the campaign speeches and writings of
historically important political candidates. 38
The ban on political campaign activities is confusing to many, including
managers of charitable organizations and the courts.' 39 For example, "legis-
lative activities" are confused with "political activities" which in turn are
confused with "political campaign activities.' 4 ° In addition, exceptions to the
130. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 14.3, at 307-08.
131. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (Supp. 1995). See also HOPKINS, supra note 1, §15.
132. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39694 (Jan. 22, 1988).
133. St Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1967).
134. United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. den., 456 U.S.
983 (1982), rehearing den. 458 U.S. 1132 (1982) ("It should be noted that exemption is lost
... by participation in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office").
135. Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151.
136. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38444 (July 15, 1980).
137. Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210.
138. Rev. Rul. 70-321, 1970-1 C.B. 129.
139. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 15.8.
140. Id. (referring particularly to Am. Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053,
1062 (1989) and Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th
1996]
19
Strefeler and Miller: Exempt Organizations: Their Nature and the UBIT
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
various requirements are created because certain undertakings are protected
by the First Amendment. For example, an EO may permissibly engage in a
boycott (e.g., NOW's convention boycott campaign 41) or institute litigation
(e.g., Exxon's oil spill142).
2. Charitable Organizations-Private Foundations
Essentially, a private foundation is a "charitable organization" that is
controlled and funded from a single source.'4 3 The "private" aspect of a
private foundation is the funding source rather than the type of activities in
which it participates.
Like public charitable EOs, private foundations are subject to organiza-
tional and operational requirements. However, the rules are more extensive
for private foundations. The organizing documents of the foundation must set
forth the way in which it will comply with the requirements regarding self-
dealing, mandatory distributions, business holdings, and jeopardizing invest-
ments. "44
a. Prohibition Against Self-Dealing
An overriding prohibition for private foundations is precluding "self-
dealing."'' 45 All transactions between a private foundation and any "disquali-
fied person"' 4 6 are prohibited. It is immaterial whether a self-dealing trans-
action benefits or harms the foundation. 47 Congress' Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation discussed several self-dealing transactions not
harmful to the foundation, but that were nevertheless prohibited:
The use of a private foundation to improperly benefit those who control
the foundation [occurs] ... where a foundation (1) purchases property from
a substantial donor at a fair price, but does so in order to provide funds to
the donor who needs cash and cannot find a ready buyer; (2) lends money
Cir. 1972), cert. den., 414 U.S. 864 (1973)).
141. Missouri v. Nat'! Org. for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd 620
F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. den. 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
142. Rev. Rul. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175.
143. HOPKINS, supra note 1, §§ 16.1, 17, 17.1.
144. HOPKINS, supra note 1, Ch. 17, at 362-63, indicates that Congress imposed these
additional requirements based upon the belief that abuses were especially prevalent with
privately controlled foundations.
145. The ban against self-dealing is analogous but not identical to the prohibition against
private inurement for public charities (discussed supra part II.C.i.e.) and the ban against
conferring a private benefit (discussed supra part II.C. 1.b.).
146. A "disqualified person" is one with a particular relationship with the private foundation
and can include a substantial contributor (including the creator of the foundation manager, 20
percent owner, family member as well certain types of corporations or partnerships, trusts or
foundations and government officials. I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)
(1995).
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to the donor with adequate security and at a reasonable rate of interest, but
at a time when the money market is too tight for the donor to readily find
alternate sources of funds; or (3) makes commitments to lease property
from the donor at a fair rental when the donor needs such advance leases
in order to secure financing for construction or acquisition of property.'48
Among other things, leasing property, extending credit, paying compensation,
furnishing goods, services or facilities, and transferring use of income or
assets have been specifically forbidden.'4 9
Stringent sanctions (they are officially called "excise taxes" rather than
sanctions)5 ° are imposed for violation of the self-dealing prohibition. 5 '
Willful and repeated violations of these prohibitions will result in involuntary
termination of EO status and the imposition of additional taxes.'5 2
b. Mandatory Distributions
A private foundation is required to make distributions for charitable
purposes.153 Mandatory distributions are required to prevent a donor from
obtaining a charitable deduction when the donation is not, in fact, used for its
ostensible charitable purpose.'54 The mandatory distribution equals five per-
cent of the value of the non-charitable assets'5 5 of the foundation and the
minimum investment return plus any repayments previously treated as quali-
fying distributions or previously set aside for a charitable project but not so
used. 5
6
c. Excess Business Holdings
Private foundations are limited in their ability to acquire or retain hold-
ings in business enterprises.' Unless the holdings exist in a functionally-
related business,' a private foundation (including all disqualified persons)
147. I.R.C. § 4941(d)(1), Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d).
148. General Explanation of Tax Reform Act of 1969, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1970)
[hereinafter Joint Committee, TRA of 1969], cited by HOPKINS supra note 1, § 20.1 n.n.2.
See also, I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(A)-(I) (1994).
149. See discussion contained in HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 20.3, at 436-51.
150. In re Unified Control Systems, Inc., 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978)
151. I.R.C. §§ 4941, 4961-62 (1994); Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4941, 53.4961-62 (1995).
152. I.R.C. § 507 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.507 (1995).
153. I.R.C. § 4942 (1994).
154. Joint Committee, TRA 1969, supra note 148.
155. I.R.C. § 4942(e)(1)(A) (1994). The foundation must compute the "aggregate fair market
value of all assets of the foundation" but certain assets are excluded. Treas. Reg.§ 53.4942(a)-
2(c)(3) (1995).
156. I.R.C. § 4942(d)(1) (1994).
157. I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2)(A) (1994).
158. I.R.C. §§ 4943(d)(3)(A), 4942(j)(4) (1994).
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is limited to holding twenty percent of the voting stock or other interest in a
business, or thirty-five percent if effective (or actual) control can be shown
to exist elsewhere. 59 This requirement is imposed to prevent business inter-
ests from compiling income rather than distributing it for charitable pur-
poses. 60
d. Jeopardizing Investments
Private foundations are prohibited from making "jeopardizing invest-
ments."'' The rationale for this prohibition is based on the fact that charity
is supposed to benefit from a foundation's existence. However, if a
foundations's assets are jeopardized, the assets may not be available for chari-
table purposes. 162
To fulfill the investment requirement, foundation managers must exer-
cise ordinary business care and prudence (the "prudent trustee" approach)
under the facts and circumstances that exist at the time of the investment. 163
There is no hard and fast rule about what constitutes a jeopardizing invest-
ment. However, the IRS will scrutinize foundation managers when tradition-
ally "risky" investments are made, such as trading in securities on margin,
trading in commodity futures, investments in oil and gas syndications, or trad-
ing in "puts," "calls," and "straddles.' 1 64
3. Social Welfare Organizations
A social welfare organization is an organization created and designed to
carry out its purposes through the development and implementation of pro-
grams impacting on community, state and/or national policy-making. 65 "So-
cial Welfare" is equated by regulation with the "common good and general
welfare" and with "civic betterments and social improvements.' ' 66 It does not
include political campaign activities or other activities that primarily consti-
tute "carrying on a business with the general public in a manner similar to or-
ganizations which are operated for profit.' ' 67
Like charitable organizations, social welfare organizations must be
159. I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2)(C) (1994).
160. Joint Committee, TRA of 1969, supra note 148, at 41.
161. I.R.C. § 4944 (1994).
162. Joint Committee, TRA of 1969, supra note 148.
163. S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), at 46, cited by HOPKINS supra note
1, § 1.4 n.n.72.
164. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 23.1, at 487.
165. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1994) (provides tax exemption for "[c]ivic leagues or organizations
not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.
See generally, HOPKINS supra note 1, ch.28.
166. Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1995).
167. Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1995).
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operated "primarily" for the promotion of social welfare. The difference is
that social welfare organizations must work for the benefit of those in a "com-
munity." A "community" is difficult to define but may not be a select group
of individuals.168 Thus, a homeowners' association would not be exempt from
income tax if it maintained the individual homes of homeowners in the
group, 169 but would be exempt if it maintained common property which can
be used and enjoyed by the general public. 7 °
Social welfare organizations differ from charitable organizations in that
they may, as "action" organizations, engage in legislative activities 7 ' and
certain political campaign activities so long as the principal purpose of the
organization is to advance social welfare. 72 But for the "action" capabilities
of the social welfare EOs, they are quite similar to charitable EOs, and often,
a single organization can qualify for exempt status as either. 173
4. Business Leagues
Business leagues are associations of persons who have a common busi-
ness interest. 174 The association must exist to promote the common business
interest of the members, and not to engage in business itself. If the organiza-
tion engages in any commercial business, even with minimal profit, it will lose
its exemption. 175 Direct lobbying is allowed. 76
The definition of "business" for purpose of the business league exemp-
tion is broad. It encompasses any activity carried on for the production of
income, including the professions, chambers of commerce, real estate boards,
boards of trade and professional football leagues. 177 However, the exemption
is not available to aid one group in competition with another group in the same
industry. For example, the exemption was denied to an organization of muf-
fler dealers which confined its membership to dealers franchised by Midas
168. Compare the history set forth in Snowling, Federal Taxation of Homeowners'
Associations, 28 TAX LAW. 117 (1974) with I.R.C. § 528 (1994) which provides an elective
tax exemption for condominium management and residential real estate management
associations.
169. Commissioner v. Lake Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul. 56-225,
1956-1 C.B. 58.
170. Rev. Rul. 74-99, 1974-1 C.B. 131.
171. E.g., Rev. Rul. 68-656, 1968-2 C.B. 216.
172. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. However, a social welfare organization may be
subject to the "political organization taxable income."
173. Id.
174. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (1994).
175. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(6)-(l) (1995); Engineers Club of San Francisco v. United States,
791 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1986).
176. Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117.
177. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (1994); HOPKINS, supra note 1, Ch. 29, at 572-96.
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International Corporation.178
Exemption will be denied where there is a lack of a "business" interest.
Thus, associations of hobbyists 19 and motorists 8° cannot be exempt from
taxation as business leagues.
Professional organizations such as medical societies or bar associations
are presumed to be business leagues rather than charitable organizations, even
though they may engage in charitable and educational activities. 81 This pre-
sumption can be overcome by showing that the organization does not direct
itself at, or concern itself with, the protection or promotion of the business
interests of its professional members. 82 An EO is required to be a business
league, however, if it engages to any substantial degree in public relations,
professional policing, or social activities, even if it merely exists to promote
good relationships among its members.'83
5. The Political Organization
A political organization is provided tax exempt status by virtue of IRC
section 527. The political action committee ("PAC") is probably the most
recognized form of this EO. However, a candidate's bank account used for
depositing contributions and disbursing campaign expenses qualifies as a
political organization, as does a candidate's newsletter fund.
A political organization can be taxed on its "political organization tax-
able income."'184 Such income includes amounts spent for improvements to its
facilities or for equipment that is not necessary for an exempt function. 85
6. Other EOs
Tax exempt status is granted to other organizations including social
clubs, 186 credit unions, 187 veteran's organizations, 188 and organizations having
labor, agricultural or horticultural purposes. 8 9 EOs of this nature are not
notably different from those EOs already reviewed, and are not discussed
separately herein.'90
178. See, e.g., Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
179. Rev. Rul. 66-179, 1966-1 C.B. 139.
180. Am. Automobile Ass'n v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1146 (1953).
181. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-504, 1971-2 C.B. 231; Rev. Rul. 71-505, 1971-2 C.B.232.
182. Rev. Rul. 70-641, 1970-2 C.B. 119.
183. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 29.2, at 580.
184. I.R.C. § 527(b) (1994).
185. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-5(a)(2) (1995).
186. I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (1994).
187. I.R.C. § 501(c)(14) (1994).
188. I.R.C. § 501(c)(19) (1994).
189. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) (1994).
190. For more information, see HOPKINS, supra note 1, Chs. 30, 31, 34.
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III. TAXING THE EOS-AN EXCEPTION TO THEIR EO STATUS THE
UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME TAX
A. Background Information
In 1950, Congress acted on its belief that EOs were taking unfair advan-
tage of their exempt status and imposed a tax on every EO's unrelated trade
or business income (hereinafter "UBIT"). 19' Congress elaborated its purpose
for the new legislation:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed
here is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of...
[501(c)] organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand
operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits re-
maining after taxes.'92
In other words, UBIT was primarily imposed to protect commercial enter-
prises from the threat of unfair competition.193
Excessive unrelated business income may cause revocation of EO sta-
tus. 194 However, UBIT was conceived and is currently thought of as a mild
and workable alternative to revocation in enforcement of the law of EO sta-
tus. 195
UBIT is most often imposed at the corporate rate.' 96 Surtaxes are appli-
cable,' 97 and estimated quarterly payments must be made.198 The revenue and
expenses associated with UBIT are reported on IRS Form 990-T.
B. UBIT Generally Defined
The Code defines unrelated business income generally as gross income
derived by an organization from any unrelated trade or business which is
regularly carried on by the organization, less deductions directly connected
191. See I.R.C. § 501(b) (1994). Under the 1950 statute, the tax applied to a limited
number of EOS, primarily charitable and trade or labor organizations. It was not until 1969
that Congress extended the tax to virtually all organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501 (1994).
192. H. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), at 36-37, cited by HOPKINS supra note
1, § 40.1 n.n. 33.
193. In recent years, along with budget deficits and "tax reform" and "tax simplification,"
an additional rational has come to the fore-that of raising revenue. This more recent
development is discussed infra, part IV.
194. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39108 (Dec. 23, 1982); Orange County Agric. Soc'y, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 893 F.2d 529 (2nd Cir. 1990).
195. See, e.g., Indiana Retail Hardware Ass'n v. United States, 366 F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
196. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 12(1) (1994).
197. I.R.C. § l1(b) (1994).
198. I.R.C. § 6154(h); Treas. Reg. § 1.6302-1(a).
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with the carrying on of such trade or business. 99 However, most court cases
discuss UBIT compliance under the three categories set forth by Treasury
Regulation §1.513-1(a).
C. UBIT as Defined by Regulation §1.1513-1(a)
Regulation §1.513-1(a) requires that an EO's gross income be subjected
to UBIT if three factors are present: (1) the income is from a trade or business;
(2) the trade or business is regularly carried on by the organization; and (3) the
conduct of the trade or business is not substantially related to the
organization's performance of its tax-exempt functions.
The manner in which the regulation is usually applied is well illustrated
in Iowa State University of Science and Technology v. United States.20 0 Iowa
State University operated a television station. The university claimed that the
income from the television station furthered its tax-exempt educational pur-
pose because the station was used to train students in the broadcasting indus-
try, provide closed circuit transmissions to classrooms, and provide revenue
to support university endeavors. The Court imposed UBIT because the
station's operations (1) constituted a trade or business, (2) operated fre-
quently and regularly, and (3) were not substantially related to the university's
exempt functions. The interpretation of the third prong of the regulatory test
was the key to the decision. The Court found that the station's earnings were
contributed to and used by the university to support educational operations.
However, the "destination" of the income (the university's educational opera-
tions) was irrelevant. 20 ' Rather, the "source" of the income was the station and
the station's activities were critical to the analysis. The station operated like
a commercial enterprise because its programs were selected in coordination
with the station's sales staff to "lure" the largest possible audience and spon-
sored largely by paid advertisers. The station's activities were much closer
to the activities of a commercial television station than those of the average
educational station.20 2 The station issued eleven hours of local programming
per week, compared to nineteen hours per week issued by less profitable
educational stations. In addition, the station partially assisted in only five of
the university's two thousand courses. The educational activities were
deemed incidental under such circumstances.
199. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (1994).
200. 500 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
201. Id. at 518. The court cited the history to the 1950 Act (H. Rept. No. 2319, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. [1950-2 C.B. 380 et seq.]; S. Rept. No. 2375, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. [1950 2-C.B. 483
et seq.]) and referred the reader to the discussion of the history contained in SICO Found. v.
United States, 295 F.2d 924, (Ct. Cl. 1961).
202. Iowa State Univ. of Science and Technology, 500 F.2d at 519.
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The application of each of the three regulatory requirements is explored
in more detail below.
1. "Trade or Business" Defined
As originally conceived, the concept of a "trade or business" was a nar-
row one. The US Supreme Court observed in 1963 that the "narrow category
of trade or business" is a "concept which falls far short of reaching every
income or profit making activity."2 °3 In recent years, however, the IRS and
the courts have settled on the view that any activity is a trade or business if it
is pursued with a profit motive or is conducted in a commercial manner.20 4
Now, it is often said that a trade or business for UBIT purposes constitutes any
activity that is carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods
or the performance of services.2 5
An EO engages in a trade or business for UBIT purposes even if the EO
carries on an activity within a larger complex of activities that furthers a tax-
exempt purpose. This requirement, contained in IRC section 513(c), means
that the IRS can fragment an EO's activities into components to look for and
subject to UBIT those activities that are unrelated to an exempt purpose. This
so-called "fragmentation rule" is a significant factor in the imposition of
UBIT. The fragmentation rule is also instrumental in the current expansion
of UBIT, as discussed further in Section IV.
2. "Regularly Carried On" Defined
Business activities of an EO will be "regularly carried on" if the activi-
ties exhibit "frequency and continuity", and are pursued in a manner similar
to comparable commercial activities in the private sector.0 6 For example, a
one-time sale of real or personal property is not an activity that is regularly
carried on, and thus does not give rise to unrelated business income. 20 7 An
occasional party, for which an EO hires an orchestra and charges admission
to the public, would not be considered frequent and continuous, 208 nor would
selling sandwiches at an annual event.20 9 However, the frequency and conti-
203. Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 197, 201 (1963). See also, Blake Constr.
Co., Inc. v. United States, 572 F.2d 820 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Gentile v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1, 5
(1975).
204. Ditunno v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 362 (1983). In this case, the tax court rejected the
more narrow, traditional requirement. See the discussion contained infra, part IV.
205. Treas. Reg. 1.513-1(b) (1995). See, e.g., West Virginia State Medical Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 651 (1988), aff'd, 882 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. den., 493 U.S.
1044 (1990).
206. I.R.C. § 512 (1994).
207. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-05-129 (Nov. 7, 1978).
208. S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), at 106-07, cited by HOPKINS supra
note 1, § 40.1 n.n.33.
209. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-05-129 (Nov. 7, 1978).
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nuity of a particular activity will be considered in its ordinary commercial
context. For example, distributing greeting cards during the Christmas sea-
son, 21 or operating a track for horse racing during the racing season, 211 would
be frequent and continuous activities because the sales and operations last as
long as similar activities in the commercial world.
The amount of preparation for an event will also be considered. 212 Pub-
lishing advertising in programs for a single sports event or artistic perfor-
mance would not ordinarily be considered a frequent and continuous activity.
Nevertheless, the single event would be deemed regularly carried on if the
event was systematically and consistently promoted throughout the year.213
3. "Substantially Related" Defined
Gross income derived from a trade or business that is regularly carried
on will nevertheless avoid UBIT if the conduct of the trade or business is
"substantially related" to the EO's exempt purposes. 2 4 A trade or business is
related to an EO's tax-exempt purpose where the activity has a causal rela-
tionship to that purpose.21 5 Further, a business activity is substantially related
only if the profitable activities "contribute importantly" to the accomplish-
ment of the exempt purpose. 216
The test to determine whether the profitable activities contribute impor-
tantly to an exempt purpose is a facts and circumstances test.21 7 Among other
things, the size and extent of the profitable activities are considered and
weighed against the needs created by the exempt purposes. The activities
cannot exceed the needs. 21 8 Thus, a grocery store operating solely to provide
training to unemployed residents of the area would be subject to UBIT if it
operates "on a much larger scale than is reasonably necessary" to provide the
training.21 9
The analysis is made even more complex by the fragmentation rule be-
cause profitable activities are broken down into their component parts.220 For
210. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-03-134 (Sept. 10, 1981).
211. Rev. Rul. 68-505, 1968-2 C.B. 248.
212. Hopkins, supra note 1, § 41.3, at 873.
213. Id.
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (1995).
215. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1) (1995).
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (1995).
217. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) and Huron Clinic Found. v. United States, 212 F. Supp.
847 (D.S.D. 1962).
218. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (1995).
219. Compare Rev. Rul. 73-127, 1973-1 C.B. 221 and Rev. Rul. 76-94, 1976-1 C.B. 171.
220. I.R.C. § 513(c) (1994), discussed supra, part III.C.3.
[Vol. 12
28
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 12 [1996], Art. 6
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/6
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: THEIR NATURE AND THE UBIT
example, a scientific organization operating an experimental dairy herd will
not be subject to UBIT for selling the milk and cream resulting from its ordi-
nary operations, but will be subject to UBIT for the component of the business
which processes the milk and cream and sells it as ice cream or pastries.221
Income from dual-use facilities is also subject to a fragmentation analy-
sis.222 A university that operates athletic facilities designed and equipped for
its students may be subject to UBIT if it makes its facilities and personnel
available for the conduct of a summer tennis camp.223 The university can
avoid UBIT only by insuring that the tennis camp is exempt for other reasons.
To insure exemption, the university must cast the income received as exempt
passive rental income,224 or as income from a separate educational activity for
youths.225
Court opinions and IRS rulings provide numerous examples of activities
that are substantially related to an EO's exempt purpose. The more innova-
tive of these include: the operation of a beauty shop and a barber shop by a tax-
exempt senior citizens' center;226 the sale of members' horses by a tax-exempt
horse breeders' association; 227 and the conduct of research and counseling
activities for the purpose of promoting business in foreign countries. 228 Ex-
amples of activities that were superficially similar to those just listed, but were
not substantially related to an exempt purpose include: the sale of heavy-duty
appliances to senior citizens by a tax-exempt senior citizens' center;229 the sale
of certain blood components by a tax-exempt blood bank to commercial labo-
ratories;230 and the conduct of a language translation service by a tax-exempt
trade association that promoted international trade relations. 231
D. Special Definitions under the UBIT Rules
Both the term "gross income" and the word "deductions" have a special
meaning in the UBIT context.
1. Gross Income Excludes "Passive" Income
221. Rev. Rul. 76-94, 1976-1 C.B. 171.
222. See discussion of the "fragmentation rule" supra, part III.C. 1.
223. Rev. Rul. 76-402, 1976-2 C.B. 177.
224. See discussion infra, part III.D. 1.
225. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-08-009 (Sept. 29, 1978).
226. Rev. Rul. 81-61, 1981-1 C.B. 355.
227. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-12-013 (Dec. 9, 1980).
228. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-05-047 (Nov. 6, 1984).
229. Rev. Rul. 81-62, 1981-1 C.B. 355.
230. Rev. Rul 66-323, 1966-2 C.B. 216, as modified by Rev. Rul. 78-145, 1978-1 C.B.
169.
231. Rev. Rul. 81-75, 1981-1 C.B. 356
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Gross income does not include passive income. 232 This exclusion is
based on the theory that passive income does not create a risk of unfair com-
petition. 233 Passive income excluded from the calculation of UBIT includes
income from interest, dividends and payments from securities loans, annu-
ities, royalties, and rents (predominantly those from real property). 234 Also
excluded are income from gains or losses from the sale, exchange, or other
disposition of property other than (a) inventory or (b) property held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business.2
35
Some unusual results flow from the passive income exception. For ex-
ample, an EQ 236 can own all of the stock of a for-profit corporation without
incurring UBIT or endangering its exempt status even if it receives dividends
from the for-profit corporation.237 Thus, an EO like the U.S. Olympic Team,
that exists to develop an amateur sports competition, can profitably license the
right to use its name and logo to sell commercial products.2 38 Also, an EO can
own a building and profitably lease space to others. 39
An EO must be careful in the passive income area, however, because the
passive income rules are complex and may be inapplicable in surprising ways.
If an EO's profitable lease arrangement can be labeled a "return of profits"
from a joint venturer, the lease income will no longer be excluded from UBIT
because the EO is not "merely passively collecting rent. 2z40 Similarly, if the
EO provides maid services under the lease, the lease income will no longer be
passive income.24'
232. I.R.C. § 512(b) (1994).
233. According to the senate report, "[the] committee believes that [these items] are 'passive'
in character and are not likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having
similar income." S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong, 2d Sess. at 30-31 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2
C.B. 483, 506, cited by Hopkins supra note 1, § 40.1 n.n.33.
234. I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(1),(2),(3), (5) (1994). See also, Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l(a)-(d)
(1995); State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. United States, 509 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1975).
235. I.R.C. § 512(b)(5) (1994). This last category of excluded items includes "gains on the
lapse or termination of options, written by the organization in connection with its investment
activities, to buy or sell securities." If any of the otherwise-excludable income is produced
from property financed through debt, part (or all) of the income may be included in UBIT.
I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(4), 514(a)(1) (1994).
236. Except for private foundations discussed supra, part II.C.2.
237. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-44-114 (Aug. 6, 1982).
238. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-06-005 (Oct. 31, 1979).
239. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5) (1995); Rev. Rul. 69-69, 1969-1 C.B. 159. However,
unrelated debt-financed income is not subject to this exclusion.
240. Mortimer Berl, Boot-Strap and Contingent Sales: The Implications of Clay Brown:
Problems of the Tax Exempt Organizations: Proposed Legislation, 25 N.Y.U. INST. FED.
TAX. at 701, 711 (1967).
241. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-24-001 (Feb. 21, 1980).
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2. Restrictive Deduction Rules
Deductions from UBIT are limited and are calculated specially. Deduc-
tions are granted only where they are "directly connected with" the conduct
of an unrelated business. To be directly connected with the conduct of an
unrelated business, an item of deduction must have a "proximate and primary"
relationship to the unrelated business. A proximate and primary relationship
exists only where expenses are attributable solely to the operation of the
unrelated business.242 In other words, just because an EO operates at an over-
all loss does not mean it can deduct all of its losses against its unrelated busi-
ness income. It can deduct only losses that are incurred in generating the
income.
The special deduction rules are best illustrated by the treatment of net
income derived by an EO from the sale of advertising. If an EO publishes a
newsletter with editorials related to its exempt purpose, but the newsletter
contains paid advertising, 24 3 the advertising income is subject to UBIT. 244 If
the editorial portions of the newsletter are published at a loss, then the edito-
rial losses may be offset against the advertising income, but losses from other
EO activities may not.245 An EO may allocate the expenses of dual use equip-
ment facilities and personnel used to publish the newsletter but such alloca-
tions must have a "reasonable" basis.2 46
It is of the utmost importance that claimed deductions be adequately
substantiated. 247 Failure to substantiate a deduction leads not only to disallow-
ance of the deduction, but also to sanctions. 24 8
E. Exceptions to the UBIT Rules
Even if a particular activity otherwise constitutes an unrelated trade or
business that is regularly carried on, the activity may escape taxation under
one of the specific statutory exceptions to UBIT. Five common exceptions are
242. Treas. Reg. 1.512(a)-l(d) (1995).
243. There is little case law defining "advertising." It has been conceived of as "business
listings" consisting of "slogans, logos, trademarks and other information which is similar in
content, composition and message to the listings found in other professional journals,
newspapers and the 'yellow pages' of telephone directories." Fraternal Order of Police, Illinois
State Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 747, 754 (1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 717
(7th Cir. 1987).
244. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 41.5, at 907.
245. Id.
246. See, Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-i (1995); Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. v. Commissioner,
732 F.2d 1058 (2nd Cir. 1984), (allocation of facility expenses where facility was used for
both tax-exempt and unrelated purposes).
247. CORE Special Purpose Fund v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 626 (1985).
248. Id.
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for (1) income generated by volunteers, (2) income from sales of convenience
items, (3) income generated by booth sales at conventions and trade shows,
(4) income generated by hospital services provided on a cost-plus basis, and
(5) income from charitable bingo games.
1. The "Volunteers" Exception
Exempt from UBIT is income from an unrelated trade or business in
which substantially all of the work is performed by volunteers. 249 This excep-
tion is available only where the voluntary performance of services is a mate-
rial income-producing factor in carrying on the business, and where substan-
tially all of the services are performed without compensation.5 0 For example,
the production and sale of recordings by a medical society would be exempt
from UBIT where the professional performances are provided without com-
pensation.25' Similarly, the production and sale of food and other products
from farming operations by a religious order would be exempt where the la-
bor was provided without compensation by the members of the order. 252
However, the income from the rental of heavy machinery would not be exempt
from UBIT, even though the rental contracts were arranged and payments
were processed by volunteers, because the voluntary labor was not a material
factor in producing the income.2 53
2. The "Convenience" Exception
Also exempt from UBIT is income from unrelated trades or businesses
that are carried on primarily for the convenience of the EO' s members, stu-
dents, patients or employees. 2 4 This exception would not be available if an
unrelated trade or business was carried on primarily to make a profit. Thus,
a laundry operated by an exempt university for the purpose of laundering
dormitory linens and student clothing would be exempt from UBIT under the
"convenience" doctrine. However a laundry operated by an exempt univer-
sity for the purpose of laundering the clothing of the general public in order
to make a profit would not be exempt.255
3. The "Convention and Trade Show" Exception
Another exception to UBIT applies to EOs that regularly conduct, as a
249. I.R.C. § 513(a)(1) (1994). See also, Rev. Rul. 56-152, 1956-1 C.B. 56.
250. H. Rep. No 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), cited by HOPKINS supra note 1, § 40.1
n.n.33.
251. Greene County Medical Soc'y Found. v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 900 (W. D. Mo.
1972).
252. St. Joseph Farms of Indiana Bros. of the Congregation of Holy Cross, Southwest
Province, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 9 (1985).
253. Rev. Rul. 78-144, 1978-1 C.B. 168.
254. I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) (1994). See also, Rev. Rul. 69-268, 1969-1 C.B. 160.
255. I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) (1994).
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substantial tax-exempt purpose, conventions or trade shows that stimulate
interest in, and demand for, the products of a particular industry, or that edu-
cate participants about new developments, products, or services that relate to
the exempt activities of the organization." 6 The income is excepted from
UBIT is that derived from the rental of display space to exhibitors257 and the
provision of supporting services, such as the use of the EO's name, promotion
of attendance, planning of exhibits and demonstrations, and provision of lec-
tures .258
4. The "Hospital Services" Exception
Income from certain services performed for small hospitals is exempt
from UBIT.259 Services must be provided at a fee which does not exceed cost,
including straight-line depreciation and a reasonable rate of return on the
capital goods used to provide the service. 260
5. The "Bingo" Exception
Income from bingo games conducted by EOs is not subject to UBIT. 261
This exception applies only to games not conducted on a commercial basis
and not in violation of state or local law.262 The IRS will contest the exemp-
tion if income is derived from players who are not present to place wagers or
receive prize distributions. 263
6. Other Exceptions
Additional specific statutory exceptions to the UBIT include income
received by thrift stores from sales of donated clothes and books to the gen-
eral public, 264 payments received by an EO in return for lending securities to
a broker, 265 and income received from the exchange or rental of membership
or donor mailing lists to other EOs. 26 6
256. I.R.C. § 513(d)(1) (1994).
257. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-3(d)(1) (1995).
258. Rev. Rul. 78-240, 1978-1 C.B. 170.
259. I.R.C. § 513(e) (1994).
260. The Medicare rules prescribe the method for determining the cost of services and the
applicable rate of return. 42 USC 1395x(v)(1)(A),(B) (1994).
261. I.R.C. § 513(f) (1994).
262. H. Rep. No. 95-1608, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), cited by HOPKINS supra note 1, §
42.2 n.n.154; see e.g., Waco Lodge No. 166, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1202 (1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 696 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.
1983).
263. Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-02-001 (Feb. 27, 1985).
264. Rev. Rul. 71-581, 1971-2 C.B. 236.
265. I.R.C. § 512(a)(5) (1994).
266. I.R.C. § 513(h)(1)(B) (1994).
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F. Application of the UBIT Rules in Special Settings
Certain types of EOs, namely educational institutions, hospitals, and
museums, have been traditional targets for UBIT. 267 These EOs are large
institutions with many different operations and income sources. The distinc-
tions made over time in the treatment of the various EOs' operations provide
a useful model for understanding UBIT.
1. Educational Institutions
An educational institution which operates as an EO is not subject to
UBIT for income derived from its basic operations. 268 It will not be taxed on
its tuition or dormitory rental revenue derived from its students. 269 Nor will
the institution be taxed on the income it receives from admission charges to
athletic events.27 °
However, an educational institution that extends its basic operations
might be subject to UBIT. Institutions will be taxed for operating travel tour
271programs that don't include an authentic educational experience, or for
providing dormitory facilities to individuals other than its students, particu-
larly where the institution provides collateral services such as meals or maid
272
service.
University bookstore sales are fragmented into their component parts,
and, as such, sales of certain items are isolated and subjected to UBIT. Items
that are directly related to the institution's educational purpose (e.g., books,
classroom supplies, and computer disks) are related and are not subjected to
UBIT. In addition, items that are carried for the "convenience" of the students
(e.g., health and beauty aids, smoking materials, or items embossed with the
university emblem) are not subject to UBIT.2 73 However, sales of all other
items (e.g., plants and clothing) are subject to UBIT.274
267. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 41.5, at 885-935.
268. H. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), at 37, 109; S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 106-07 (1950), cited by HOPKINS supra note 1, § 40.1 n.n.33.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Compare Rev. Rul. 78-43, 1978-1 C.B. 164 with Rev. Rul. 70-543, 1970-2 C.B. 172.
272. The distinctions between permissible and impermissible services is discussed in Rev.
Rul. 69-178, 1969-1 C.B.
273. I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) (1994). See also, Rev. Rul. 69-268, 1969-1 C.B. 160. This is the
"convenience" exception discussed in the text accompanying supra note 235.
274. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-25-222 (1980). See generally, Byron C. Keeling, Property Taxation
of Colleges and Universities; The Dilemma Posed by the Use of Facilities for Purposes
Unrelated to Education, 16 J. OF COLL. & UNIv. L. 623 (1990).
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2. Hospitals
In many ways, hospitals are similar to educational organizations in their
basic operations. Income derived from patients and businesses that are nec-
essary for patient care are related to the hospital's exempt purpose, and will
not be subject to UBIT. Thus, income from gift shops, coffee shops and park-
ing lots will not be taxed so long as they are used by patients, employees, and
hospital visitors. In addition, other income derived by hospitals is not taxed.
Income from sales of pharmaceutical supplies, provision of necessary diag-
nostic tests to patients, provision of rehabilitation services to outpatients, and
sales of hearing aids as part of the rehabilitation process is not subject to
UBIT. 275
However, income from other activities is more controversial. For ex-
ample, sales of pharmaceuticals supplies to members of the general public
visiting their private physicians in the hospital building may or may not be
subjected to UBIT, depending upon the position of the reviewing court. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that such sales were sub-
ject to UBIT because the sales were not related to the services provided by the
hospital, and were unfairly competitive with commercial pharmacies. 276 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the pharmaceutical sales
were related to the services provided by the hospital because one of the func-
tions of the hospital was to attract physicians to the community and provide
facilities to retain them. 277 Testing services provided to members of the gen-
eral public visiting their private physicians in the hospital building are simi-
larly controversial.278
3. Museums
Tax-exempt museums escape UBIT for reasons similar to those de-
scribed for other educational institutions. Thus, museums are not taxed when
they receive income from parking lots, snack bars, and other auxiliary ser-
vices.
Museum gift shop sales are fragmented in a manner similar to university
bookstore sales. However, the distinctions are more refined, and the IRS
appears to have developed certain characteristics which trigger a closer look
at the applicability of UBIT.2 79 In this regard, the IRS is more likely to con-
275. Rev. Rul. 78-435, 1978-2 C.B. 181.
276. Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 449 U.S. 824
(1980).
277. Hi-Plains Hosp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1982).
278. Compare Rev. Rul. 85-110, 1985-2 C.B. 166 with 85-109, 1985-2 C.B. 165.
279. See, e.g., "Exempt Organizations Annual Technical Review Institute for 1979,"
Training 3177-01 and 02 (3-79), cited by HOPKINS supra note 1, § 41.5 n.n.279.
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sider that the sales of "luxury" items are an unrelated business, even if those
items bear a museum logo. 280 Items that are "adaptations" (rather than "repro-
ductions") of museum displays are closely scrutinized, 28' as are items that are
"utilitarian" or "ornamental. ' 282
IV. GENERAL ANALYSIS OF UBIT UNDER CURRENT LAW
A. Overview
In recent years, EOs have substantially increased their fund-raising
activity. Congress first noted increases in fund raising years ago, 283 and it has
accelerated since then. 284 Now, more than ever, EOs engage in a plethora of
fund-raising activities because of diminished government funding, economic
limitations on private contributions, and an exploding number of nonprofits
competing for limiteddonor dollars. 285
At the same time that EOs have been trying raise funds to support their
operations, Congress has been attempting to raise revenues to fund federal
programs. In today's climate of economic reform, EOs are often seen as anti-
capitalistic (and therefore anti-democratic) because they compete with tax-
paying commercial enterprises. 28 6 One Philadelphia newspaper recently re-
ported:
Many nonprofits operate just like for-profit businesses. They make huge
profits, pay handsome salaries, build office towers, invest billions of
dollars in stocks and bonds, employ lobbyists and use political action
committees to influence legislation. And, increasingly, they compete with
taxpaying businesses. 287
The forces impinging upon EOs, private businesses and Congress, have
combined to place pressure on exempt status for certain organizations. Even
though the statutory changes have been minimal, the rationales and tests tra-
ditionally used to impose UBIT are changing. Some rationales and tests are
280. HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 41.5, at 896.
281. Murphy, New Pronouncements from the IRS, 62 MUSEUM NEWS (No. 1) 55 (Oct. 1983),
cited in HOPKINS supra note 1, § 41.5 n.n.281.
282. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38949 (Jan. 6, 1983).
283. Joint Committee, TRA 1969, supra note 148 at 66-67.
284. See, e.g., comments on Rep. James H. Bilbray, Chairman, House Subcomm. on
Procurement, Taxation and Tourism, Comm. on Small Business, reprinted in 94 TAX NOTES
TODAY 117-24, June 17, 1994.
285. Id. The IRS approved approximately 44,000 new nonprofits during 1993. At the end
of 1993 there were 1,110,265 EOS and 527,847 filed information returns with the IRS. Id.
286. See, e.g., Gilbert M. Gaul & Neill A. Borowski, Warehouses of Wealth: The Tax-Free
Economy, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 18-24, 1993 (series of articles).
287. Id.
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simply being more strictly enforced, while others are evolving into entirely
new standards.
The changing rationales and tests are discussed below in two categories.
The first are those changes relating to the "trade or business" requirement.
The second are those relating to the "substantially related" requirement.
B. Changing Rationales and Tests
1. The "Trade or Business" Requirement-The Unfair Competition
and Commerciality Doctrine and The Profit Motive Test
The three most important rationales and tests for imposing UBIT are
Congress' original unfair competition rationale, and the courts' subsequently-
developed commerciality doctrine and profit motive test. These three ration-
ales and tests are properly discussed in the context of the first requirement of
Treasury Regulation 1.5 13-1: the "trade or business" requirement.288
a. Virtual Disappearance of the Unfair Competition Rationale.
Congress' guiding principle behind UBIT was to eliminate a source of
unfair competition. 28 9 However, the original rationale of unfair competition
was seldom used to determine whether UBIT should be imposed. The IRS,
the Tax Court, and a majority of the Courts of Appeal imposed UBIT after
considering whether the EO was engaged in an "unrelated trade or business
which is regularly carried on. '290 The Fifth Circuit Court dismissed the im-
portance of analyzing the unfair competition rationale 29' with these words:
Although the legislative history speaks of competition, those who actually
drafted the statute avoided the word as if it were the plague .... [T]he
statute and regulations establish a conclusive presumption that the con-
duct of a trade or business by an exempt organization [not substantially
related to exempt functions] constitutes unfair competition against taxable
entities engaged in similar activities. 292
One of the few courts relying upon the unfair competition rationale prior
to 1986 was the Seventh Circuit. 293 While holding that UBIT did not apply,
the court determined that the existence of unfair competition was "very im-
portant in determining whether a given activity is to be taxed as an unrelated
trade or business."
288. See HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 12.3, at 257-63.
289. See text discussion contained, supra part III.A.
290. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1995).
291. Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1982).
292. Id.
293. Hope School v. U.S., 612 F.2d 298, 302-04 (7th Cir. 1980); See also, Carle Found. v.
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b. The Emerging Commerciality Doctrine-Is Profit Bad?
Even as Congress' unfair competition rationale was being ignored, the
commerciality doctrine was being created. The commerciality doctrine was
not created by Congress, but is a body of law engrafted by the courts onto the
statutes and regulations.2 94 The doctrine involves an activity that is engaged
in a "commercial" manner because a for-profit "counterpart" engages in the
same activity.2 95 One commentator explains the commerciality doctrine as
follows:
When a judge sees an activity being conducted by a member of the busi-
ness sector and the same activity being conducted by a member of the
nonprofit sector, he or she almost always, motivated by some form of
intuitive offense at the thought that a nonprofit organization is doing
something that "ought to" be done or is being done by a for-profit orga-
nization, concludes that the nonprofit organization is conducting that
activity in a "commercial" manner. This conclusion then leads to a find-
ing that the "commercial" activity is an "unrelated" activity, with adverse
consequences in law for the nonprofit organization, either as respects
unrelated income taxation or tax exemption. 29
6
To the extent the above-quoted description is valid, the "single most
important element of the law of tax-exempt organizations today "297 is
grounded in notions outside of the Internal Revenue Code. In fact, the truth
of the description can be verified by chronologically reviewing the case law.
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the commerciality
doctrine in 1945.298 The Court reviewed the tax exempt nature of a chapter of
the Better Business Bureau and found that one of the Bureau's purposes was
to promote a profitable business community. The Court held that the organi-
zation had a "commercial hue" and that its activities were "largely animated
by this commercial purpose. "299 '
The commerciality doctrine (this time accompanied by its counterpart
test) next appeared in a case decided in 1961.30 An organization published
and sold religious literature to further its purpose of upgrading the quality of
teaching materials for Bible instruction. It generated "very substantial" prof-
United States, 611 F.2d 1192, n.6 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
294. See HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 38.1, at 829.
295. Id.
296. Id. § 38.1, at 830.
297. Id. § 38.1, at 829.
298. Better Business Bureau of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
299. Id. at 283-84.
300. Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. C1. 1961), cert. den., 368
U.S. 985 (1962).
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its.301 The court indicated its agreement with the IRS that the existence of
"very substantial" profits was "some evidence indicative of a commercial
character." The Court applied the counterpart test, stating: "[T]here are many
commercial concerns which sell Bibles, scrolls, and other religious and semi-
religious literature which have not been granted exemption as to that part of
their businesses. ' 30 2 The court thus developed a three-part commerciality
doctrine consisting of: (1) the scope of an EOs' net profits; (2) the extent of
its accumulated surplus; and (3) the amounts expended for tax-exempt func-
tions.
In 1969, the First Circuit established the "rule" that profit is evidence of
commerciality. In that case, another publisher of religious literature con-
ducted its operations on a small scale, but in the same manner as any other
commercial publisher. 30 3 To the First Circuit, the fact that the organization's
ultimate purpose was religious did not warrant exemption. Rather, the court
conferred exemption only because the organization had no profit. The court
concluded that "the deficit operation reflects not poor business planning nor
ill fortune but rather the fact that profits were not the goal of the operation. 304
Other cases followed during the 1970s and 1980s, always making the
connection between profits and commerciality, most often in the context of
religious publications. 30 5 One of the most interesting and important cases
outside of the religious context was Disabled American Veterans v. United
States.3 0 6 It was an important case because its reasoning was adopted by the
Court of Appeals and later became the subject of a pivotal (but ambiguous)
U.S. Supreme Court case in 1986307 The Disabled American Veterans
("D.A.V.") engaged in two income-producing activities which were at issue
in the case. First, it offered premiums30 for persons contributing to D.A.V.
as a result of direct mail solicitations. Second, D.A.V. rented its donor list to
others at varying prices following the usual trade practice of the direct-mail
industry. The court concluded that trading premiums for contributions did not
301. Id. at 803.
302. Id. at 806, n. 11.
303. Elisan Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1969).
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Pulpit Resource v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594, 611 (1978); Christian Manner
Int'l v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 661 (1979); Inc. Trustees of Gospel Worker Soc'y v. United
States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 381 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd 672 F.2d 894 (D.D. Cir. 1981). A few
cases made the same connection between profits and commerciality but did not involve religious
publications. These include: Washington Research Found. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH)
1457 (1985) and Junaluska Assembly Hous., Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1114 (1986).
306. 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
307. See discussion infra, part IV.B.I.d.
308. Premiums consisted either of (1) books, maps and charts or (2) wrist calendars. The
premiums were comparable to items sold in retail markets.
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constitute a trade or business where the contribution required to obtain the
premium was double that of the retail value of the premium. The excessive
markup negated the trade or business nature of the transaction. However,
renting the mailing list did constitute a trade or business because the rates
were standard industry rates. In other words, enormous profits were deemed
to be non-competitive: where D.A.V.'s donors paid a much higher price for
goods than they would have from a commercial enterprise, D.A.V. was not
operating a trade or business. By contrast, where profits were in line with
those of the industry as a whole, D.A.V. was operating a trade or business.
c. The "Profit Motive" Test
At the same time that some courts were allowing huge profits to be ex-
empt from UBIT under the commerciality doctrine, other courts employed the
"profit motive" test to require UBIT where huge profits existed." 9 The "profit
motive" test was adopted from IRC section 162 where a business deduction
is allowed if an activity " was entered into with the dominant hope and intent
of realizing a profit. '3 °10 Adoption of the test from section 162 is validated by
Treasury Regulation section 1.513- l(b). The regulation provides: "in general,
any activity of [an EO] which is carried on for the production of income and
which otherwise possesses the characteristics required to constitute a 'trade
or business' within the meaning of section 162" is a trade or business for
purposes of sections 511-513. 3"
The "profit motive" test is extremely broad. In endorsing it, one court
went so far as to hold that the existence of a profit motive is the most impor-
tant indication of whether an activity is a trade or business. The court stated,
"there is no better objective measure of an organization's motive for conduct-
ing an activity than the ends it achieves.- 312
To determine whether there is a profit motive, courts look to both sub-
jective and objective factors. 313 In Professional Insurance Agents of Michi-
gan,3 14 an EO's executive vice-president provided direct evidence of its sub-
jective intent by testifying that an insurance endorsement program would have
been discontinued if the program failed to generate income. In Louisiana
Credit Union League v. United States,3"5 the Fifth Circuit held that an EO had
309. S.S. Trade Ass'n of Baltimore, Inc. v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1494 (4th Cir. 1985);
Carolinas Farm & Power Equip. Dealers Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 699 F.2d 167 (4th Cir.
1983).
310. Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
311. Rabin, supra note 28.
312. Carolina Farm & Power Equip. Dealers v. United States, 699 F.2d 167, 170 (4th Cir.
1983).
313. National Water Well Ass'n Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 75, 86-87 (1989).
314. 78 T.C. 246 (1982).
315. 693 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1982).
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a profit motive because, according to the objective evidence, it extensively
endorsed and administered a highly profitable program at no risk or expense
to itself.
d. The U.S. Supreme Court Attempts Change in 1986
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court changed each of the three rationales
supporting the "trade or business" requirement.1 6 In American Bar Endow-
ment, the Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed the importance of the unfair
competition rationale, ambiguously cited the profit motive test, and disap-
proved of the excess profits rationale (along with other rationales used by the
lower court) underlying the commerciality doctrine.317
The case involved a tax-exempt charitable organization, the American
Bar Endowment ("ABE"), which was organized to "advance legal research
and promote the administration of justice." ABE generated revenues for its
charitable operations by providing group insurance policies to its members.
In return, ABE received over forty percent of its members' premium pay-
ments. In return for its forty percent, ABE negotiated premium rates with
insurers, selected the insurance underwriters, solicited members to purchase
the policies, and collected premium payments. The IRS attempted to assess
a tax deficiency arising from ABE's failure to report UBIT on the proceeds
from the insurance program. The lower courts agreed with ABE using the ra-
tionale found in D.A.V.-I: the phenomenal success of the insurance program
in generating funds for ABE was found to be evidence of non-commercial be-
havior. Two additional rationales were used by the lower courts: (1) the pro-
gram was devised and operated as a means of fundraising; and (2) the ABE
members could have voted to return all profits to themselves, but did not. Ac-
cording to the lower courts, the existence of uncommonly large profits, the
fundraising intent of ABE, and the potential return of profits to ABE's mem-
bers meant that the insurance program was not a "trade or business" and that
UBIT did not apply.
However, the Supreme Court on review held that the insurance program
was a trade or business for purposes of applying UBIT. Most importantly, the
Court reaffirmed the importance of the unfair competition rationale by stat-
ing:
The undisputed purpose of the unrelated business income tax was to pre-
vent tax-exempt organizations from competing unfairly with businesses
whose earnings were taxed.... This case presents an example of precisely
the sort of unfair competition that Congress intended to prevent .... [I]f
ABE may escape taxes on its earnings it need not be as profitable as its
316. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
317. Id.
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commercial counterparts in order to receive the same return on its invest-
ment. Should a commercial company attempt to displace ABE as the
group policy holder, therefore it would be at a decided disadvantage. 18
In addition to reaffirming the unfair competition rationale, the court cited the
profit motive test and discussed its development and use by the circuit courts
in a footnote. 319 However, since the profit motive test had not been used
below, that test was neither critiqued nor validated.
Finally, the Court noted its disapproval of the way in which the exces-
sive profits rationale was used by the lower courts to support the
commerciality doctrine.3 20 In the words of the Court:
We cannot agree with the [lower courts] that the enormous [profits] gen-
erated by ABE's insurance program demonstrate that those dividends
cannot constitute 'profits.' Were ABE's insurance markedly more expen-
sive than other insurance products available to its members, but ABE
nevertheless kept the patronage of those members, we might plausibly
conclude that generosity was the reason for the program's success. The
[lower courts] did not find, however, that this was the case. ABE prices
its insurance to remain competitive with the rest of the market. [citation
omitted]. Thus, ABE's members never squarely face the decision whether
to support ABE or to reduce their own insurance costs.
If the Supreme Court's statements had been clear, no questions about
applying the "trade or business" requirement to UBIT would remain after
American Bar Endowment. However, as discussed below, debate over the
importance of unfair competition and the relative values of the commerciality
doctrine and the profit motive test is still very much alive.
e. Inconsistent Applications of American Bar Endowment
The Supreme Court's decision clarifying the "trade or business" require-
ment for UBIT has been inconsistently applied by appellate courts. After
American Bar Endowment, most courts continued to emphasize the "profit
motive" test even though the Supreme court had neither critiqued nor vali-
dated it.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit emphasized the
"profit motive" test by finding that the presence or absence of the risk of unfair
competition was not critical. In Fraternal Order of Police, Illinois State
Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Commissioner,32' the Seventh Circuit stated:
318. Id. at 114-15.
319. Id. at n.1.
320. Id. at 111 (citing Professional Ins. Agents of Michigan v. Commissioner and Carolinas
Farm & Power Equip., supra note 312.
321. 833 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1987).
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No court has yet created a general exception to the unrelated business
income tax based solely on a showing that the tax-exempt organization did
not compete, or threaten to compete unfairly with taxpaying entities.
Rather, the cases hold that activities engaged in for the production of
income do not constitute a "trade or business" within the meaning of [§]
513(c) where the income is derived from charitable contributions rather
than from the sale of goods or the performance of services.
Under the facts of the case, the court determined that the journal published by
the Fraternal Order of Police was identical to another magazine published for
profit. The court imposed UBIT under the "profit motive" test. The D.C.
Circuit ruled similarly in a case where the EO's activity was provided by
commercial entities. 32
2
In addition, despite the fact that the Supreme Court refuted the rationales
underlying the commerciality doctrine, the doctrine is still being raised by
commentators32 3 and by Congress.3 24 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit re-
cently affirmed the use of several factors specifically indicative of
"commerciality. ' '325 The factors include: (I) the sales of goods or services in
competition with commercial firms; (2) the use of pricing formulas, promo-
tional materials, and advertising similar to those of commercial entities; and
(3) work provided by employees with business experience rather than volun-
teers. 
32 6
2. The "Substantially Related" Requirement
a. Historical Perspective
As discussed previously, since Congress implemented UBIT in 1950,
one of the three standard requirements for its imposition has been the "sub-
stantially related" requirement. UBIT is imposed unless a trade or business
activity substantially relates to one or more of the EO's exempt purposes. 327
A trade or business activity meets the substantial relationship requirement
only if it "contributes importantly" to the accomplishment of an EO' s exempt
purpose(s). 28 The fact that the income from the activity is destined to support
the EO's exempt purposes is irrelevant. Instead, the important consideration
322. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S., 925 F.2d 480, 482-83 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
323. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 38.2, at 841 and Trevor A. Brown, Religious
Nonprofits and the Commercial Manner Test, 99 YALE L.J. 1631 (1990).
324. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 prohibited an EO from providing "commercial-type
insurance."
325. Living Faith v. Commissioner, 950 F.2d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'g 60 TCM 710
(1990).
326. Id.
327. Treas. Reg. § 1.1513-1(a) (1995).
328. Treas. Reg. § 1.513(d)(2) (1995).
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is the activity itself, or the source of income.
A complicating factor occurred in 1967, however, when the Treasury
promulgated the "fragmentation rule."32 9 While the rule was adopted under
the "trade or business" requirement, it also affected the "substantially related"
requirement. Under the new rule, each fragment of a trade or business activity
had to contribute importantly to the EO's exempt purpose in order to avoid
UBIT. If only one portion of an activity related to the EO's exempt purpose,
it did not exempt other portions from UBIT.
However, a problem developed with the way in which the Treasury il-
lustrated the application of the "fragmentation rule" to the substantial rela-
tionship requirement. Example 7 of Regulation 1.513-1 (d)(4) involved an EO
which was formed to advance the interests of a particular profession. 3 0 The
EO in the Example published a monthly journal containing editorial materi-
als and advertising. The editorials were substantially related to the EO's
exempt purpose, but the advertising, selected in the manner of ordinary com-
mercial activities, did not. UBIT was therefore imposed on the advertising
income. However, Example 7 failed to clarify the legal consequence of ad-
vertising which was substantially related to an EO's exempt purpose.
b. The Supreme Court Clarifies the "Substantially Related"
Requirement in 1986
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the Regulation's Example 7.
In U.S. v. American College of Physicians,"' the American College of Phy-
sicians existed to maintain high standards in medical education and medical
practice, to foster measures to prevent disease, and to improve public health.
In furtherance of its exempt purposes, the EO published the Annals of Inter-
nal Medicine, a highly-regarded monthly medical journal containing schol-
arly articles. The journal accepted for each issue advertising containing
medical information about the use of medical products. The IRS contended
that Example 7 created a per se rule taxing advertising income. Under this
interpretation, the EO's net proceeds would be subject to UBIT. The EO, on
the other hand, contended that Example 7 was intended to require that adver-
tising conform only to the substantial relationship test. That is, if all of the
advertising activity contributed importantly to the EO's exempt purposes, no
UBIT would be imposed. The EO contended that in this case, all of its adver-
tising did conform to the substantial relationship test because the advertising
disseminated valuable information about medical advancements to the EO's
journal subscribers and helped to advance its exempt educational and medi-
329. See discussion of Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1995) contained in part III.C. 1.
330. Example 7 is found in Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) (1995).
331. 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
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cal care purposes.
The Supreme Court first determined that Example 7 did not create a per
se rule requiring taxation of advertising income. However, the Supreme Court
did not entirely agree with the EO because it next determined that the intel-
lectual impact of the advertising upon member subscribers was irrelevant.
Only the conduct of the EO was important. Even if the EO' s members gained
valuable information from the advertising, the effect on the members was not
relevant. Since the EO did not systematically or comprehensively design the
advertising to educate its readers or to fulfill the EO's other exempt purposes,
the advertising was not related to those purposes. The Court stated:
[We] are bound to conclude that advertising in Annals does not contrib-
ute importantly to the journal's educational purposes. This is not to say
that the college could not control its publication of advertisements in such
a way as to reflect an intention to contribute importantly to its educational
functions. By coordinating the content of the advertisements with the
editorial content of the issue, or by publishing only advertisements reflect-
ing new developments in the pharmaceutical market, for example, perhaps
the [EO] could satisfy the stringent standards erected by Congress and the
Treasury.332
This statement reflects the most important result of U.S. v. American College
of Physicians.33 3 The Supreme Court attempted to focus the "substantially
related" analysis on the manner in which an EO's fund-raising activity is
conducted as opposed to the outcome of that activity.
c. Inconsistent Applications of U.S. v. American College of Physicians
As with the "trade or business" requirement, application of the principles
set forth in U.S. v. American College of Physicians has been inconsistent. Of
the three appellate court decisions specifically dealing with the "substantially
related" requirement, only one followed the Supreme Court in focusing on the
manner in which the activity was conducted.
In Illinois Association of Professional Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,33 4 the Seventh Circuit asked the crucial question required by Ameri-
can College of Physicians. In determining whether fee income was taxable
if it was received in return for performing promotional and administrative ser-
vices in connection with the sale of insurance, the court appropriately found
that:
332. Id.
333. See e.g., Matthew A. Aiken, Note, Insurance Trade Association Held Subject to
Unrelated Business Income Tax: Indef. Ins. Agents of Huntsville, Inc. V. Commissioner, 47
TAX LAW. 815-25 (1994).
334. 801 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1986).
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[The EO] did not merely inform its members of the general need for [in-
surance] coverage through its publications. Nor did it provide coverage
where none was available in the market.... Rather, [the EO] endorsed a
particular [insurance] program in a manner which provided convenient
marketing, advertising and administrative services to the offering insur-
ance company, generated income for the Association, and provided its
individual members convenient coverage. (emphasis added).335
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Texas Apartment Association v. United
States336 all but ignored the language of American College of Physicians. The
court used a two-prong test for determining whether the EO's activities and
purposes were "substantially related:" (1) the activity was "unique" to the
organization's exempt purposes; and (2) the direct benefits of the activities
flowed to the EO's members. The Fifth Circuit denied the application of
UBIT, but its' analysis bore no resemblance to that of the Supreme Court.
The most recent case was issued by the Eleventh Circuit. In Independent
Insurance Agents of Huntsville, Inc. v. Commissioner,33 7 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court's decision that commissions earned by a tax-exempt
trade association from providing insurance for public agencies were subject
to UBIT because the activity generating those commissions was not "substan-
tially related" to the EO's exempt purposes. Although the court purported to
focus on the manner in which the EO's activity was conducted,3 3 8 the court
actually focused on the end results, precisely in contrast to the requirements
of American College of Physicians.33 9
3. Other Changes
Two rationales or tests for imposing UBIT are evolving. However, these
rationales and tests have not yet become the subject of inconsistent appellate
court decisions. Developments relating to the "commensurate" test and the
"primary purpose" rule are discussed separately in this subsection.
a. New Life For The Commensurate Test
The commensurate test is becoming more important test in determining
whether UBIT should be imposed. It was first articulated by the IRS in
1964.340 The test requires that a charitable organization maintain program
activities that are commensurate in scope with its financial resources. In the
1964 Revenue Ruling, the IRS agreed that an organization could retain its tax
335. Id. at 995.
336. 869 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1989).
337. 998 F.2d 898 (11 th cir. 1993).
338. Id. at 901 (citing United States v. Am. College of Physicians, supra note 331).
339. See also, Aiken, supra note 333.
340. Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 186.
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exempt status even though it derived most of its income from rents because
it engaged in adequate charitable functions.
The commensurate test, which is somewhat related to the operational
test,3 4 ' resurfaced in 1990 when the IRS began a close review of the fund-
raising practices of charitable organizations. At that time, the IRS asked its
auditing agents to determine whether charitable organizations meet the "com-
mensurate" test through the use of the audit check sheet entitled "Exempt
Organizations Charitable Solicitations Compliance Improvement Program
Study Check sheet.""34 The IRS reviewing agent is required to determine
whether the charitable organization is engaging in sufficient charitable activ-
ity relative to its available resources, including gifts received through fund-
raising campaigns as measured against the time and expense of fund-raising.
In 1990, the IRS also used an organization's failure to pass the commen-
surate test as one of the reasons to revoke its tax-exempt status.3 43 The IRS
concluded that the commensurate test was violated because the organization
involved expended only about four percent of its revenue for charitable pur-
poses over a two-year period. The remaining ninety-six percent of its revenue
was allegedly spent for fund-raising and administration. The IRS stated:
The "commensurate test" does not lend itself to a rigid numerical distri-
bution formula-there is no fixed percentage of income that an organiza-
tion must pay out for charitable purposes. The financial resources of any
organization may be affected by such factors as start-up costs, etc. In each
case, therefore, the particular facts and circumstances of the organization
must be considered. Accordingly, a specific payout percentage does not
automatically mandate the conclusion that the organization under consid-
eration has a primary purpose that is not charitable. In each case, it should
be ascertained whether the failure to make real and substantial contribu-
tions for charitable purposes is due to reasonable cause.
.... While there is no specified payout percentage, and while special
facts and circumstances may control the conclusion, distribution levels
that are low invite close scrutiny. The "commensurate test" requires that
organizations have a charitable program that is both real and, taking the
organization's circumstances and financial resources into account, sub-
stantial. Therefore an organization that raises funds for charitable pur-
poses but consistently uses virtually all its income for administrative and
promotional expenses with little or no direct charitable accomplishments
341. See discussion part II.C.l.b.
342. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF FUND-RAISING 368 (1991).
343. Unpublished technical advice memorandum, reprinted in 4 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
726 (July 1991).
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cannot reasonably argue that its charitable program is commensurate with
its financial resources and capabilities.3 44
b. The Declining Importance of the "Primary Purpose" Rule
The harsh nature of the traditional "primary purpose" rule is exemplified
by the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in Better Business Bureau of Wash-
ington, D.C. v. United States:345 "the presence of a single... [nonexempt] pur-
pose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the
number or importance of truly... [exempt] purposes." The Eighth Circuit
slightly eased the harshness of this rule in 1967.346 It held that nonexempt
activity would not result in loss or denial of exemption where it was "only
incidental and less than substantial.
347
The "primary purpose" rule has further declined in importance. The
decline is exemplified by a federal court case where a public parking facility
retained its status as a charitable organization.3 48 The organization was
formed by several private businesses and professional persons to construct
and operate a parking facility. The purpose of the facility was to attract shop-
pers to a city center and a validation stamp system was used to encourage
patronage to the founders' shops. The district court concluded that the city
was the primary beneficiary of the store owners' efforts, stating "[the] busi-
ness activity itself is similar to that which others engage in for profit but it is
not carried on in the same manner; it is carried on only because it is necessary
for the attainment of an undeniably public end.
349
Even though the IRS does not officially subscribe to this relaxed posi-
tion,3 50 in the area of health care it has viewed seemingly private purposes as
being for public benefit in the long run.351 Where an organization was formed
to attract a physician to a medically under served rural area and provided the
doctor with a building and facilities at a reasonable rent, the IRS stated that
''any personal benefit derived by the physician (the use of the building in
which to practice medicine) does not detract from the public purpose of the
organization nor lessen the public benefit flowing from its activities." '3 52
344. The organization is still contesting its tax exempt status in United Cancer Council,
Inc. v. Commissioner 100 T.C. 162 (1993).
345. 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
346. See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1967).
347. See supra, part II.C. 1.d.
348. Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal) aff'd 481
F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973).
349. Id. at 977.
350. Rev. Rul. 77-111, 1977-1 C.B. 144.
351. Rev. Rul. 73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 174.
352. Id.
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V. PRINCIPLED ARGUMENTS TO AVOID THE IMPOSITION OF UBIT
In light of the uncertainty surrounding two of the three components of
UBIT, it is essential for EOs to understand the legal principles discussed
herein and the strengths and weaknesses of those principles. EOs may be the
only entities capable of, or interested in, opposing ubiquitous UBIT. To date,
their efforts have been inadequate. As one commentator states: "The non-
profit community has not been quick to respond with a convincing rationale
for the continuation of tax exemptions. This has been particularly the case
with respect to charitable organizations [citations omitted] and the competi-
tion issue." '353 If EOs do not provide the principled arguments to avoid the
logical fallacies in the current case law, no one else will.
From these authors' perspectives, the largest threat to EOs is the wide-
spread use of the "profit motive" test. This test is used most often by the
appellate courts to decide whether a fund-raising activity is a "trade or busi-
ness." If the test continues to develop as it has, it will threaten all EOs' prof-
itable fundraising efforts and disregard only those with negative cash flows.
Fortunately, however, the "profit motive" test should be easy to refute.
It was never specifically sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court and it contains
some logical flaws. Furthermore, the prevalent use of the "profit motive" test
is based upon an incomplete evaluation of the policies underlying UBIT.
Congress never intended that EOs eliminate all profitable activities. As the
Supreme Court stated in American College of Physicians:
Congress did not force exempt organizations to abandon all commercial
ventures, nor did it levy a tax only upon businesses that bore no relation
at all to the tax-exempt purposes of an organization, as some of the 1950
Act's proponents had suggested [citations omitted]. Rather, in the 1950
Act it struck a balance between its two objectives of encouraging benevo-
lent enterprise and restraining unfair competition by imposing a tax on the
"unrelated business taxable income" of tax exempt organizations.354
(emphasis added).
Most certainly, Congress did not decide to tax activities simply because they
are profitable. EOs must make this argument forcefully.
EOs are further threatened by the fact that commentators and the courts
do not always analyze the correct issues in context. When such misguided
analysis occurs, even favorable case law becomes less useful. For example,
one statement by the Fifth Circuit should provide excellent ammunition to
refute the worst parts of the "profit motive" test. In Texas Apartment Asso-
353. See HOPKINS, supra note 1, § 4.2, at 57.
354. 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
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ciation v. U.S.,35 5 the court ridiculed the IRS for arguing that an EO should
have given its product away instead of selling it for a profit. Unfortunately,
the court did so in the context of the "substantially related" analysis rather
than the "trade or business" analysis. This flaw allows the reasoning to be
attacked, and perhaps ignored, by those who don't thoroughly understand
UBIT's regulations and underlying rationale.
VI. STRENGTHENING EXEMPT STATUS AND AVOIDING
UNNECESSARY UBIT
Before the IRS exacts UBIT, there is much an EO can do to strengthen
its position. First, EOs should review their mission statements annually.
Since the mission statement contains the exempt purposes, annual review will
allow the EO to shape its activities to contribute substantially to its goals. If
the original scope of the mission statement is no longer valid, the statement
should be modified or a new one created in accord with the organizational
rules discussed in section II.
Second, an EO should review its activities to determine if they contrib-
ute to its exempt purposes. Criteria for determining the way in which activi-
ties contribute to exempt purposes should be established. Although a few
unrelated activities are allowed under the primary purpose rule, establishing
such criteria will focus the EO's efforts.
Activities which meet the established criteria should then be recorded
along with the revenues and costs associated with them. Even activities that
are generated by joint ventures with other EOs should be recorded and ana-
lyzed. The records should be supported by time sheets and job descriptions.
Furthermore, the time sheets and job descriptions should be tied directly to
workpapers which show a consistent method of allocating resources to differ-
ent types of activities.
Each EO should identify potential conflicts of interests. All salaries and
benefits provided should be compared with other institutions to determine
their reasonableness. All loans should be demonstrably advantageous to the
organization.
By taking these actions, EOs can strengthen their exempt status to avoid
unnecessary UBIT.
355. 869 F.2d 884 (5th'Cir. 1989).
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